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ABSTRACT
Beginning in 1979 with the newly elected Thatcher Government and continuing under successive
Conservative and Labour Governments, the United Kingdom has embarked on a two-decade-long
experiment in economic reform. We present evidence that the reform process has succeeded in making
the UK more market-friendly than its European competitors. In fact, by the 1990s Britain ranked near the
top of the league tables for freedom of markets, in some cases even ahead of the United States. To
evaluate the effects of these reforms we compare trends in macroeconomic outcomes in the UK relative
to the US, Germany, and France. During the 1980s and 1990s Britain halted the relative declines in GDP
per capita and labour productivity that had characterized earlier decades, and partially closed the gap in
income per capita with France and Germany. These gains were mainly attributable to relative rises in
employment and hours. Unlike its EU competitors, Britain was able to achieve high
employment-population rates with rising real wages for workers. The case that the change in economic
performance can be credited to market-oriented reforms is harder to prove. Nevertheless, based on our
own macro-level analyses, and micro-level evidence from several companion studies, we conclude that
economic reforms contributed to halting the nearly century-long trend in relative economic decline of the
UK relative to its historic competitors, Germany and France.
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card@econ.berkeley.edu1This refers to GDP per capita in purchasing power parity units, as reported in our table 8, which
includes 13 OECD countries. The precise position of the UK varies with the number of countries included
in the analysis and particular purchasing parity adjustment used.
What Have Two Decades of British Economic Reform Delivered?
For much of the 19
th and 20
th centuries Britain, which pioneered the Industrial Revolution, had a
disappointing growth record, falling markedly from the top ranks in the league economic tables. In 1979,
the UK was 12th in per capita GDP among advanced OECD countries, well below Germany, France, and
other EU economies.
1   In response to this weak economic performance, recent UK governments have
adopted policies designed to move the economy back to “premiere league” status.  Beginning with Mrs.
Thatcher and continuing under John Major and Tony Blair, these reforms have sought to increase the
efficacy of labour and product markets and limit government and institutional involvement in economic
decision-making.
The move toward more markets and less government is not unique to the UK.  Many other
advanced economies also responded to the economic challenges of the 1980s and 1990s by granting
markets more leeway in the allocation of resources and the setting of prices.  All the major economies
eliminated restrictions on the flow of capital by the early 1980s.  Most privatized state-run industries in
the 1980s and 1990s.  All lowered marginal tax rates for high-income earners.  Most also made labour
contracts more flexible and moved from national wage setting to more localized collective agreements in
the 1990s.  For its part, the EU Commission pushed competition policies and the reduction of  subsidies
to declining industries while seeking a uniform social charter to regulate labour market outcomes. 
Outside the EU, the other English-speaking economies – the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – 
moved toward less state and institutional intervention in the economy.
Have two decades of economic reform significantly shifted the market orientation of the UK
economy relative to other advanced OECD economies, or has the UK only kept pace with its peers? 
What have the reforms done for aggregate economic output and the average income of citizens?  Have the
reforms improved the position of the UK in the economic league tables?2
This paper examines these questions.   Section 1 compares the market-orientation of the UK
relative to other advanced economies using a diverse set of market indicators.  We find that the post-1980
reforms have made the UK more market-friendly than its EU competitors, and that in the 1990s the UK
ranked higher on some measures of freedom of markets than the US.  Section 2 contrasts macro-economic
outcomes.  We show that during the 1980s and 1990s the UK arrested the relative declines in GDP per
capita and labour productivity that had characterized earlier decades, and partially closed the gap in per
capita income with France and Germany through relative gains in employment and hours.  While the UK
did not experience an American-style “New Economy” boom, it combined high employment-population
rates with rising real wages for workers: an achievement that the US was unable to match until the late
1990s.  Section 3 examines the link between the reforms and outcomes.  Since there is no ready
counterfactual against which to compare the observed UK performance, our analysis is more judgmental. 
Based on macro-level analyses and the micro-level evidence available from several companion studies,
however, we conclude that economic reforms contributed to halting the nearly century-long trend in
relative economic decline of the UK relative to its historic competitors, Germany and France.  
1.  The Market-Friendliness of the UK and other Advanced Economies
“They used, when I first came in, to talk about us in terms of the British disease.  Now they talk
about us and say, ‘Look, Britain has got the cure.  Come to Britain to see how Britain has done it’ That is
an enormous turn-around.”    Margaret Thatcher, Financial Times, 15 February, 1988
“Government should have a role that is enabling: supporting small businesses, encouraging
technological advance; investing in science; above all, promoting competition and removing the barriers
to business growth... I call it a Third Way ... Supporting wealth creation.  Tackling vested interests. 
Using market mechanisms.”    Tony Blair, speech at World Economic Forum, Davos 18 January 2000
For the past two decades British economic reforms have been motivated by a desire to increase
the reliance on market forces and reduce the role of the state in the determination of prices and the
allocation of resources.  Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative government privatized industries and council
housing, enacted laws to weaken trade unions, created financial incentives for workers to choose private3
2Since local governments must “compete” for residents and businesses (in the Tiebout sense),
many economists believe that market forces exert greater discipline on the local public sector than on the
central government.  We therefore classify reforms which decentralize political decision-making as pro-
market, and those that centralize authority as anti-market.
pensions, and reduced the benefits available to unemployed workers, all the while preserving national
health and other features of the welfare state.  The Major government pursued a similar agenda,
abolishing the Wages Councils and privatizing many of the remaining state-owned enterprises.  Even
after the defeat of the Conservatives, Tony Blair’s New Labour government continued to introduce
market-enhancing reforms.  It created tax breaks for employee share ownership programs, opposed EU
directives that were interpreted by private employers as anti-business, and enhanced the work incentives
of the income support system.   In the realm of monetary policy, Labour went beyond the Tories by
shifting interest-rate-setting authority from the Treasury to an independent Monetary Policy committee. 
While there are some exceptions –  the Thatcher campaign to centralize the public sector and limit the
authority of local government, and the Blair efforts to ease the formation of unions and introduce a
national minimum wage – the main thrust of UK policy reforms has been to reduce the economic role of
the state and enhance the role of markets.
2
For purposes of analysing the potential effect of these reforms on the economic performance of
the UK relative to other advanced countries, it is important to determine whether these reforms were
larger, smaller, or similar to those in other advanced countries.  This in turn requires measures of the
institutional and policy stance of advanced countries.   In the absence of a single GDP-style measure of
the free market stance of economies, we examine a variety of indicators that rate countries by the way
different markets determine outcomes.  Some of these indicators are based on objective data while others
are based on the assessments of expert analysts or surveys of managers.  Some of the measures are
produced by think tanks with conservative ideological bents, such as the “economic freedom” indices of
the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation.  These indices stress particular measures of economic
freedom, such as low taxes, which fit a more conservative agenda, while ignoring social inclusion factors4
such as spending on education.  Another broad set of measures are the indexes of “competitiveness”
produced by the World Economic Forum, most recently in conjunction with the Harvard Center for
International Development.  These indices mix the stance of policy, institutions, and specific outcomes,
and give higher scores to economically successful social democratic regimes than the freedom indices. 
Finally, the OECD and some independent scholars have produced indices of regulations and procedures
in particular markets, such as labor markets, product markets, and capital markets.  
All of these measures of the market friendliness of institutions have shortcomings.  Some are
formed by weighting linear sums of sub-indices, with the weights determined subjectively, and with some
potential measures excluded.   Some are scaled in ways that have little basis in theory or other empirical
work.  Some treat all regulations and administrative decrees as if they were rigidly enforced, when in fact
the degree of enforcement of regulations that limit markets varies across countries.  All the measures
ignore potential complementarities or substitutions among institutions. 
Competitiveness indices have other problems.  The groups who provide these measures have
changed their modes of calculating competitiveness over time, so that their indices do not reflect the same
underlying data over time.  In 2001, for example, the Fraser Institute revised its historical indices,
producing generally modest adjustments as they accumulated additional data (see www.fraserinstitute.ca)  
The World Economic Forum-Harvard Center for International Development 2000 Competitiveness
Report reported two different indices, one for “current competitiveness” and one for “growth
competitiveness”, reflecting the different weights placed on the same data for different purposes.  Finally,
the measures for individual markets can be criticized for focusing on some features of markets and
regulatory mechanisms but not on others.  For instance, measures of labour market performance
concentrate on the extent of centralization of bargaining and employment protection legislation, but not
on the potential for court suits over discrimination or insurance of pension moneys.  Comparisons of the
market-friendliness of  product markets ignore difference in bankruptcy laws, which can greatly affect
business formation and dissolution.  While the sub-indices necessarily cover only parts of economies,5
3Comparing the higher ranking that the Heritage/WSJ gives to Israel, which has conscription, than
the Fraser Institute, Alvin Rabushka (2000) argued that the “Fraser Institute index is far superior to that of
the Heritage/WSJ. It is based on far more extensive research, deliberation, and testing by far more
qualified and distinguished scholars”.  
they provide checks on the more aggregate measures.  If an aggregate index rates an economy as market-
friendly while it has highly restrictive labour contracts or a highly regulated product market, then we will
know that something is amiss.  These measures also allow analysts to relate policies or institutions to the
specific outcomes they are designed to affect, rather than to measures like GDP per capita, which depend
on a wider set of factors.
Where the UK Fits in Economic Freedom and Competitiveness
Differences and shortcomings among the indices notwithstanding, the principal indicators of the
market stance of economies show that the policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s made the UK one of the
most market friendly economies in the world.  The high rank of the UK in market friendliness at the turn
of the 21
st Century reflects more rapid market-oriented reforms in the UK than in most other advanced
economies, rather than a general increase in regulation in other countries.
a.  Measures of Economic Freedom
The indices of economic freedom produced by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation
value key features of capitalist economies: private property rights, freedom to operate a business, and
freedom of capital and labor markets.  Both include measures of free trade, which reflect international
policies, while neither includes measures of immigration policies.  Each treats cursorily the labour market
institutions that have drawn continuing policy attention in the wake of the divergence of unemployment
and employment-population rates between the US and the EU in the 1980s and 1990s.   Morever, the
indices differ in their emphasis on particular dimensions of “freedom” (Hanke and Walters, 1997).  The
Fraser Institute Index rates countries with military conscription as having less economic freedom, and
gives countries with higher top marginal tax rates and government transfers and subsidies lower scores.
3 6
4In the Freedom House ranking in 1996, the UK was tied with the US and 4 other countries for
the top rank.  
5We exclude Singapore, Hong Kong and Bahrein from the rankings since they are not advanced
OECD countries, but in some years they score higher than the UK
The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal index penalizes higher corporate and value-added taxes. 
Reflecting the view that even a democratically chosen state sector is inimical to economic freedom, the
Fraser and Heritage indices rate the size of government as important negative indicators of freedom.  Both
measures penalize high inflation, although this is an outcome of economic policy and market function,
rather than an indicator of market orientation.
A third aggregate index of economic freedom was created by Freedom House.  This index differs
somewhat from the other two – for example, it ignores the level of taxation but counts freedom of
association in the labour market.  The index was produced only one, and so we leave it out of our
analysis.  Nevertheless, it is sufficiently highly correlated with the other two indicators that we do no
harm to the analysis by excluding it.
While the Fraser and Heritage measures lead to somewhat different rankings of the market stance
of particular countries, the high correlation between them shows that they are measuring essentially the
same phenomenon.  For all of the countries covered, including the less developed countries, Hanke and
Walters (1997) report a rank-order correlation between the two indexes of 0.85 in 1995-96.  For advanced
OECD countries, we obtain a rank correlation of 0.83 between the Fraser and Heritage/WSJ measures. 
Most importantly, both indices give a relatively high rank to the UK in the 1990s.  The Heritage/WSJ
index ranks the UK third in 1996 among advanced OECD countries in market friendliness (after the US
and New Zealand, tied with the Netherlands) and 5th in 2001 (after Ireland, New Zealand, US, and
Luxemburg).
4   According to the Fraser Institute index, the UK was tied for second with the US in 1995
among the advanced OECD countries (after New Zealand), while in 1999 it ranked 2nd after New
Zealand and just ahead of the US.
5 7
6Canada also adopted wage and price controls in the period between 1975 and 1980, and yet the
FII shows a rise in economic freedom.  
a.1  Fraser Institute Index
Because the Fraser Institute Index (FII) is available from 1970 to the present, while the Heritage
index covers a shorter period, we use the FII to measure the change in the UK’s position over time.  The
FII measures the degree of economic freedom on a scale from 1 to 100, with higher values reflect more
freedom in market transactions.
 Table 1 reports the FII for the UK and other major OECD countries every five years from 1970
to 1995 and for 1999.  The levels and trends in the value of the index for various countries accord well
with informal observations on the level and change in policy stances toward markets.  For example, most
analysts place the US and other English-speaking countries at the market-friendly end of the spectrum,
and Nordic countries and other social democratic EU countries at the other end.  The FII orders the
countries in the same manner.  Still, the index has potential errors.  It does not deal with the
implementation or enforcement of regulations that limit markets, so countries like Italy with a sizeable
underground economy are arguably given too low a score.  It also ignores the use of the judicial system to
regulate market transactions, which may lead to an overstatement of the market freedoms in the US.  
From 1970 to 1975 the index shows a decline in economic freedom in most countries (though not the US)
when governments struggled to control inflationary pressures.  This is odd since the US introduced wage
and price controls in this period while many other countries relied on collective bargaining agreements to
contain wage pressures.
6   From 1980 to 1999 there was a general trend toward increased market
freedoms. 
Focusing on the UK, the FII tells a clear story about trends in the market friendliness.  In the
1970s, before the Thatcher reforms, the UK scored relatively low among advanced countries in the
economic freedom league table.  In 1970 and 1975, when the UK had exchange controls, it ranked 17
th
and  16
th.  By 1980, after the elimination of controls, the UK had risen to 13
th position.  Over the8
7Freedom of exchange in capital and financial markets includes a subcategory for freedom of
citizens to engage in capital transactions with foreigners, so this is not exclusively a measure of domestic
market activities.  Note that the vast majority of countries score 100 in the legal structure and property
rights sub-index in 1997, while the remainder are in the 90+ range, except for Greece. 
following two decades it rose sharply in the rankings, so that by 1999,  the UK stood second behind only
New Zealand among the advanced OECD countries.  Measured by the change in FII points, the UK was
the third most reformed economy between 1980 and 1999, after New Zealand and Portugal.  Thus, in an
epoch of increasing market-friendly economic reforms, the UK reformed more than most other advanced
countries.
The Fraser Institute index contains seven components, four of which – the total size of
government expenditures, monetary policy and price stability, regulation of international exchange and
freedom to trade with foreigners, and freedom to use alternative currencies – fall outside the purview of
the micro-domestic policies which are our primary focus.  Accordingly, in Table 2 we show the three
components of the FII that more closely reflect domestic market freedoms: the structure of economy and
use of markets, legal structure and property rights, and freedom of exchange in capital and financial
markets.
7   As a crude summary, we also report the unweighted average of these components.  They show
that the UK ranked in the middle of the pack in 1980 but near the top by 1999, considerably ahead of
most of its EU competitors.
b.   World Economic Forum/Harvard Institute Competitiveness Scores
Since 1980 the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) and the World
Economic Forum (WEF) have developed jointly or separately a world competitiveness report of
countries.   From 1998 to 2000 the WEF collaborated with Harvard University’s Center for International
Development to give the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR)  In contrast to the economic freedom
indices, indices of competitiveness measure the “set of institutions and economic policies supportive of
high rates of economic growth in the medium run.” (GCR, 2000, p 14).  The competitiveness scores are
based on a mixture of quantitative economic measures and the responses of executives to questions about9
the situation in their country.  Most of the questions in the 2000 Report ask executives to rate “the extent
to which” a country fits a particular statement on a scale from 1 to 4; earlier reports used a scale from 0
(not at all) to 100 (to a great extent).  The response rate to the survey has varied in the range of 15% to
20%, with non-respondents having similar characteristics to respondents.  
Because the competitiveness scores are heavily weighted toward actual (or prospective) economic
performance, the rankings of countries differ from rankings based on the market friendliness of their
institutions. Some highly regulated countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries,
and others such as Japan that have performed better during various time periods than the market-friendly
English-speaking countries receive higher competitiveness scores.  For instance, in 1990 Japan,
Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden scored higher on the world competitiveness index than less-regulated
UK, Ireland, and Australia.  Across all countries, however, Hanke and Walters (1997) report that
competitiveness scores are highly correlated with the Fraser Institute and Heritage/WSJ indices of
economic freedom, with rank-order correlation coefficients in the area of 0.85. 
Table 3 shows the competitiveness index rankings for advanced OECD countries in the 2000
Global Competitiveness Ranking and some of the sub-indices that go into the aggregate measures. 
Column 1 records ranks in the GCR’s “growth competitiveness” index, which is designed to measure a
country’s standing in the factors likely to produce economic growth.  Column 2 gives its rank in “current
competitiveness”, which is designed to measure factors that are likely to determine the level of economic
activity.  While the two indices rank some countries differently, most notably Germany (poor in growth
competitiveness but good in current competitiveness), they give similar scores to the UK.  By either
measure, the UK ranks in upper third or so of advanced OECD countries.  This is considerably above the
position of the UK in GDP per capita tables, but falls well short of the top 3 rating that the UK received in
the indices of economic freedom.  
Why does the UK rate lower in competitiveness than in market freedoms?   The lower ranking
does not reflect differences in the ranking that the GCR and Fraser or Heritage foundations give to10
8The GCR gives the UK a mixed record in use of modern technology.  The UK scores among the
top 10 countries in terms of innovation but much lower in its ability to copy technological advances of
other countries (World Economic Forum-HCID Economic Competitiveness 2000 Report).  The Fraser
Institute measures of protection of patent rights gives the UK a rank of 14 among 15 advanced countries
(Fraser Institute, 2001, exhibit 4-3A).
9The OECD supplemented the questionnaire with information from other sources, so that about
10 percent of the data comes from other sources.  See Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999), and the
overview in OECD (1999, chapter VII).
indicators of market freedoms.  For example, column (3) shows that the UK is 2
nd in one GCR indicator
that meshes well with the indexes of market freedom -- the time executives say that they spent dealing
with government bureaucracies.  Column (4) shows that the UK ranks 6
th in protection of property rights,
which was one of the major factors in indices of economic freedom, ahead of  the US, Germany, and
France.   The area where the UK does relatively poorly is in the provision of public services.  This is
illustrated in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.  The UK scores 17
th in terms of overall infrastructure and 20
th in
the quality of public schools.  While economists are uncertain about the contribution of infrastructure to
national output, and of the effect of school quality on productivity, both factors surely do affect economic
performance.
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c. Indices for Specific Markets: Product Markets
To assess the extent and intrusiveness of regulations on business in 1988 the OECD sent a
detailed questionnaire to member states asking about 1,300 different regulations concerning economy-
wide and industry specific laws, regulations, and administration of laws.
9  The responses to this
questionnaire form the basis of the OECD regulatory data base, which is the most comprehensive and
detailed body of information on product market regulations across countries.   The data base measures
administrative regulations but does not take account of differences in the use of the judicial system to
regulate product markets.  Since legal challenges to business operations are a greater threat in the US than
in most other countries, indexes based on the IRDB arguably over-state the market-friendly orientation of
the US economy.  Only in the US do liability suits have the potential to bankrupt firms (as they have done11
10There are factors that work in the other direction as well.  The regulatory scale gives the UK a
lower score in barriers to entrepreneurship than the US, which is often cited as the ideal environment for
aspiring entrepreneurs.  The gap between the US and UK comes from two sub-indices: one that measures
the “regulatory and administrative opacity” (attributed to the high number of administrative procedures
and services involved in business startups) and another than measures barriers to competition.  However,
the IRDB may be misleading in this respect, because it fails to account for lenient US bankruptcy laws,
which enable entrepreneurs who fail to start up again with less cost than in most other countries.  And the
OECD also failed to collect data on land-use regulations (OECD, 1999, footnote 8) which may be less
restrictive in most parts of the US than the UK or other European countries.
in the cases of asbestos and breast implants, for example) and only in the US are class action and
individual employment discrimination suits a major concern for business.
10  In addition, the OECD
regulatory data base does not really address the extent to which state regulators actually enforce
regulations, which depends on the level of state funding for government agencies, the salaries paid to civil
servants, and modes of compliance.
There are various ways to summarize the information on the 1,300 regulations in the OECD data
base.  In a companion report on the OECD report on the product market regulations, Nicoletti, Scarpetta,
and Boylaud (2000) use a factor analysis procedure to derive aggregate measures of the burden of
regulation in two key domains: inward oriented regulations, covering state control of industry, barriers to
entrepreneurship, and regulations of domestic markets; and outward-oriented regulations, covering
barriers to trade and investment.  The scaling is such that higher scores mean a thicker and more intrusive
set of regulations – and thus one nominally less friendly to market mechanisms.  Different aggregations of
the information in the database would give different measures to each country than Nicoletti, et al
produce, but would presumably give a similar ordering of countries by the scope and depth of regulatory
practices.  We use the Nicoletti et al measures in this paper.
Table 4  records the product market regulatory scores for the OECD countries.  In all of the
inward oriented regulatory domains and in the overall score the UK is the least regulated economy.  The
US, Ireland, and Australia also show limited regulatory activity.  At the other end of the spectrum, Italy,
Norway and Greece have the most highly regulated product markets.  In the outward-oriented domain the12
11In April 2000, the UK Competition Commission issued a report finding that new car prices were
about 10 percent higher in the UK than elsewhere in the EU – see Detroit News (2000).
UK is tied with Ireland and Australia for the least regulated economy.  Over all domains the UK is ranked
as the least regulated of the OECD economies, with Ireland in second place and the US in third.  
Nicoletti et al (2001) have used information from the OECD regulatory data base to create a
measure of the coverage of regulations for each country from 1990 to 1996 that allows us to measure the
changes in regulatory practices across countries.  They find that all of the covered countries reduced
regulations in the 1990s, but that the UK deregulated its markets to a greater extent than did the US,
France, and Germany.  In 1990 the UK was 7
th in freedom from regulation whereas in 1996 it was at the
top of the table.  This illustrates one of our major points: that the market reform stance of the UK
continued post-Mrs. Thatcher. 
That the UK developed a more market friendly regulatory regime in product markets than
Germany and France fits well with general views of government involvement in these economies.  But
this does not necessarily mean that consumers are uniformly better off in Britain.  The prices of some
goods such as automobiles have long been higher in the UK than on the continent, reflecting the structure
of private product markets.
11   Still, the OECD has a clear message: the UK has gone from a regime of
relatively medium regulation of business to a relatively deregulated regime in the period of economic
reforms.
d. Indices for Specific Markets: Labour Markets
The labour market is arguably the most idiosyncratic market in modern capitalist economies.  The
extent and nature of unionization, employer associations, and regulations vary widely across countries,
leading many analysts to try to explain differences in economic performance across countries in terms of
differences in labour market institutions (for example Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and Driffil, 1988;
Freeman, 1998; OECD, 1999).  To do this, these analysts have developed ratings of country wage-setting
institutions and employment protection legislation, and have estimated union density and collective13
bargaining coverage.  
Table 5 shows how different analysts ranked countries by their degree of centralization of wage-
setting from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.   In this table a high number means that the analyst regards
the wage setting system as highly centralized while a low number means that the analyst regards the
system as decentralized.  Most analysts built their rankings from a limited number of “facts”(such as
whether there is a central union negotiating body, whether there is one bargaining federation or many,
etc.) analogous to the way the freedom or competitiveness indices are constructed.  Several of the
rankings give rise to ties between countries because the underlying facts are similar.  Still, there is
subjectivity in the building blocks chosen and, perhaps more importantly, in the weights that analysts
accord them in aggregating to a single statistic.  While analysts generally place the same countries at the
top or bottom of the table in terms of market-based wage setting, there are some notable differences (for
instance, in rating Japan or France).  The UK is invariably among the countries that have more market
based wage-setting.  Over the period of reforms, the UK moved up the rankings as it shifted from a
collectively bargained system of wage-setting to a largely market determined system.  New Zealand
followed a similar pattern.  
But rankings can only tell us about changes in relative position.  The final column in the table
gives absolute changes in centralization of wage-setting as summarized by Elmeskov, Martin, and
Scarpetta (1998).  They code countries from 1 (decentralized wage setting) to 3 (coordinated or
centralized) and specify periods of change.  Eight countries change their wage-setting stance in the period
they covered, with five moving towards less centralized institutions while the Netherlands, Ireland, and
Italy moved in the opposite direction.
Quantitative data on the extent of unionism and collective bargaining coverage in the UK confirm
this picture of movement toward more market-oriented wage-setting.  In 1980 approximately 50% of UK
workers were unionized and 70% were covered by collective bargaining (see Appendix Table 5).  By
contrast, twenty-odd years later, in 1997, 30% of UK workers were unionized and only 44% were covered14
by collective bargaining.  Relative to its major European competitors, the UK has a smaller fraction of
nonunion workers who are covered by collective bargaining.  France, which has a very low rate of 
unionization, has a very high rate of collective bargaining coverage because of laws that extend union
contracts to nonunion workplaces.  Germany lies somewhere between the UK and France.  Over the
1980s and 1990s unionization and collective bargaining coverage remained roughly stable in Germany,
compared to the declines in the UK.  This reflects a more general pattern of divergence among OECD
countries in the importance of unionism in the labour market.    
In addition to having different institutions for wage-setting, advanced countries have different
rules that regulate employment adjustments.  EU countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy make it difficult
to lay off workers with permanent contracts, while Germany and Belgium make it difficult to hire
temporary labor.  All continental EU countries have works councils and require management to consult
with those councils about plant closings, which invariably delays closures and increases their cost. 
Employment protection policies effectively shift the property rights of a job from management to the
incumbent worker.   Several analysts have stressed the role of employment protection legislation (EPL) in
constraining employer’s flexibility and ultimately holding down the rate of employment growth (Lazear,
1990; Bertola, 1990; Grubb and Wells, 1993).
Comparisons of EPL across countries show that throughout the past two decades the UK was
among the least restrictive countries on the rights of employers to alter employment at will. In the 1994
Jobs Study the OECD ranked the UK in fourth place in terms of reliance on market forces as opposed to
EPL intervention in the labour market. Table 6 records ratings of the strictness of the EPL regulations in
the late 1980s and late 1990s by the OECD.  The scores given to the regulations are scaled so that low
values (minimum of 0) imply little employment protection while high values (maximum of 6) imply
considerable employment protection.  The A measures in columns 1, 2, and 4 are based on data for
regular contracts and temporary contracts.  The B measures (in column 4, for the late 1990s only) add
additional information on regulations covering collective dismissals.  All the EPL measures show that the15
UK , US, and other English-speaking countries have the least restrictions on the rights of employers to
alter employment at will.  Over time, however, the difference between the UK and EU countries with
more restrictive legislation declined over this period, as other EU countries weakened their regulation of
regular contracts and eased the rules on temporary contracts.  Because the UK had relatively weak
regulations to begin with, employment protection legislation is an area where most other EU countries
have moved their policies closer to those of the UK, though substantial differences in employment
protection remain.
e. Indices of Specific Market: Business Formation and Capital Markets
To assess the ease of starting a new business, researchers in corporate finance have gathered data
on regulations covering start-ups (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2000).  Columns 1-3 of
Table 7 summarize their analysis in terms of three broad measures of the ease of business formation: the
estimated number of procedures needed to start a business, the estimated time to meet those requirements;
and the estimated direct and indirect cost of meeting the requirements relative to GDP per capita. 
Djankav et al not the wide variation in these measures: “To meet government requirements for starting to
operate a business in Austria, an entrepreneur must complete 12 procedures taking at least 154 days and
pay US$11,612 in government fees” (Djankov, et al, p. 1).  This compares with 4 procedures that take 7
days at a cost of $2806 in the US and even less in Canada (Djankov, et al, Table III). The UK is number 2
in terms of the estimated costs of forming a business relative to GDP, right behind New Zealand and
ahead of the US.
To assess the protection given to investors to invest or loan money to firms, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) have developed indices of the rights of investors and creditors in the
various countries.  Columns 4-7 of Table 7 present their summary measures of the assessment of law and
order in the country (on a scale from 0 to 10), based on the International Country Risk Guide, and their
indices of shareholder rights (scale of 0 to 4)  and creditor rights (scale of 0 to 5).  The majority of the
advanced countries obtain the highest value in the rule of law measure, while some of the lower income16
countries scoring substantially lower than the maximum 10 score.   There is greater variation in the
protections given to shareholders and creditors, at least by these measures.  The US, for instance, provides
considerable anti-director protection while Italy does not; whereas the UK provides considerable creditor
rights while France does not.  La Porta et al (1999) show that the different legal codes produce different
corporate valuations, but do not attempt to link these institutional differences to differences in aggregate
national economic outcomes.
f.  Summary
The evidence in this section shows that UK governments have made considerable progress in
reforming the economy in a pro-market direction over the past two decades.  In the late 1970s the UK was
ranked near the middle of all advanced countries in terms of the market friendliness of its institutions. 
Some indices put the UK even further down, reflecting such factors as the relatively high rate of
government ownership, exchange rate controls, and high marginal tax rates.  By the  late 1990s, the UK
stood at or near the top of the rankings – close to and in some cases even ahead of the US.   To the extent
that orthodox economic thinking is correct and a greater market orientation of policy and institutions
means better functioning markets and superior economic outcomes, the UK should have benefitted from
these reforms by an improvement in its relative economic performance.  What in fact happened? 
2.  Trends in UK Economic Performance, 1960-1999
In this section we analyze the economic performance of the UK relative to the US and its major
EU peers, France and Germany, from 1960 to 2000.  We focus on the relative trends in aggregate output
per capita, and on the associated trends in output per unit of labor input and labor input per capita.  There
are several reasons for this narrow focus.  First, output per capita is the subject of many international
comparisons, and policy-makers regularly monitor league tables comparing gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita.  Second, internationally comparable data on GDP and labor inputs are available for a
long period, facilitating an analysis of changes in UK relative performance in these dimensions.  Third,17
12The PPP factors used by the BLS are very similar to those used by OECD.  For the time periods
shown in the table, the use of PPP-adjusted real GDP (versus GDP at market exchange rates) mainly
effects cross-country comparisons in 1980.  PPP factors suggest that exchange rates for most European
countries (except the UK and Italy) were significantly over-valued relative to the US.  Thus, 1980 PPP-
adjusted real GDP figures for Germany and France are 30 percent  lower than market-based figures, while
PPP-adjusted GDP figures for the Nordic countries are 60 percent lower.
other macroeconomic indicators, such as the unemployment rate, are highly correlated with labor input
per capita . Finally, and most importantly, although conventional economic reasoning says that market-
oriented reforms will raise total income, there is no claim that such reforms will improve other potentially
important outcomes, such as the poverty rate or the distribution of income.  Advocates for market-
oriented reforms usually emphasize the goal of increasing income.  Taken on their own terms, then, it is
important to evaluate the effect of the UK reforms on total market income.
As a starting point, Table 8 presents data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the
level and rank of GDP per capita for 13 leading countries.  Real GDP figures for each country have been
converted to a common currency (1998 US dollars) using purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted
exchange rates.
12  A comparison of 1960 and 1979 figures for the UK suggests that prior to 1980 UK
relative economic performance was declining relative to the US (from 74 to 68 percent of the US average)
and relative to most other countries, including Germany and France.  In 1960 UK output per capita was
similar to the level in West Germany and 15 percent higher than in France.  By 1979, GDP per capita in
Britain was 15 percent lower than in West Germany, 12 percent lower than in France, and a little lower
than in Italy.  Britain’s position in the league table fell from 3
rd to 12
th.  Over the 1980s and 1990s the UK
did better.  Relative to the US, per capita GDP in Britain fell slightly, from 68 to 66 percent of the US
average.  Relative to Germany and France the UK gained slightly. Nevertheless, the UK remained 12
th
among the 13 countries in the table.
The comparisons in Table 8 open up a series of questions about how the UK might have done
absent its market reforms.  Would UK output per capita have continued to decline relative to other
countries in the 1980s and 1990s in the absence of a sustained reform effort?  Or, was the relative decline18
13The data on population are taken from US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000a).  Appendix Table
1 presents data on the changing shares of young and old people in the populations of the UK, Germany,
France, Italy, Ireland, and the US.
14The series for West Germany and France track each other very closely and we have averaged
them to avoid clutter in the graphs.
of the UK in the 1960s and 1970s driven by particular forces that would have come to end anyway?  To
help answer this question we delve into the sources of differential growth of the UK and three key
competitors: Germany, France, and the US in the pre-1980 and post-1980 periods.  We also present some
limited comparisons with Italy and Ireland.
a.  Trends in the Growth Rates of GDP per Capita and Its Components
Tables 9 and 10 summarize decompositions of the changes in the relative rate of growth of GDP
per working age adult (age 15-64 in most cases) between the UK and the key comparison countries.  We
analyze GDP per working age adult rather than GDP per capita to remove the variation in per capita GDP
that is attributable to shifts in the fraction of children or elderly in the population, and that are thus
independent of economic reforms.
13   The first three columns of Table 9 present the rates of growth of
GDP per working age adult in the 1960-1979 and 1979-1999 periods for each country.  The underlying
data for the UK, the US, and Germany and France, which we plot in Figure 1,
14 show that the UK had
slower growth in output per working age adult than Germany or France in the 1960s and 1970s, but
somewhat faster growth than the US.  The UK also grew more slowly than Italy or Ireland.  After 1979,
the UK and the US experienced similar growth rates of around 2.0 percent per year while Germany,
France, and Italy had slower growth.  Only Ireland, which achieved a 3.7 percent annual growth rate in
real GDP per working age adult, out-performed the UK and US in the 1980s and 1990s.  In terms of
changes in growth rates before and after 1979 the UK performed well relative to Germany, France, and
Italy, and about the same as the US.
The growth rate in GDP per working age adult can be decomposed into the sum of the growth
rate in GDP per unit of labor input and the growth in labor input per working age adult.  The upper panel19
15For reference, Appendix Table 2 presents data on employment-population rates and average
hours per working age adult for the various countries.  
of Table 9 presents this decomposition using employment per working age adult as a measure of labor
input, while the lower panel shows a decomposition based on hours of work per working age adult.  The
underlying series for  the UK, Germany, France, and the US are plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
15   The figures
show that all countries experienced a slowdown in the rate of growth of productivity after 1979.  The
slowdown was bigger in Germany, France, and Italy than in the UK, and bigger in the UK than the US. 
Compared to the 1960s and 1970s, when growth rates in output per worker ranged from 1.6 percent per
year in the US to 3.6 percent per year in Germany and France, the growth rates of output per worker in
the 1980s and 1990s  were remarkably similar across countries.   The same  story characterizes the growth
rates in GDP per hour.  In the 1960s and 1970s the UK lagged about 1 percent per year behind Germany
and France in the growth of productivity per hour and even further behind Italy, but after 1979
productivity per hour grew at similar rates in all four countries.
Unlike the productivity trends, which converged across countries in the post-1979 period,  trends
in labor input show little evidence of convergence.  Prior to 1979, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and
Ireland all had declining employment-population rates, although the rate of decline was slower in the UK
than elsewhere in Europe.  After 1979, the UK (and Ireland) moved to a more “US-like” pattern of rising
employment rates, while Germany, France and Italy continued to experience declining employment rates,
albeit at a slower pace than pre-1979.  Hours per working age adult show a similar pattern of divergence.
In Germany, France, and Italy, hours declined at about 3/4 to 1 percent per year in the 1980s and 1990s,
whereas in the UK the post-1979 trend was negligible, and in the US the trend was positive. 
The implications of these shifting trends in productivity and labor input in the UK relative to
other countries are summarized in Table 10.  The first column of the table shows the growth rate  in GDP
per working age adult in the UK relative to a particular comparison country.  The second and third
columns divide this difference into differences in the growth of GDP per worker and employment per20
working age adult, while the fourth and fifth columns divide the difference into relative growth of GDP
per hour and hours per working age adult.  Panel A decomposes relative growth rates in the “pre-reform”
period (1960-79), panel B decomposes growth rates in the “reform” period (1979-1999), and panel C
shows the decomposition of the relative change in growth rates between the two periods.  For example,
panel A shows that in the 1960-79 period the UK had 0.63 percent per year slower growth in GDP per
working age adult than in West Germany, and 1.02 percent per year slower growth than in France.   This
resulted from slower relative productivity growth in the UK dominating a more modest decline in the
growth of labor inputs.   Relative to the US, on the other hand, the UK had 0.48 percent faster growth in
GDP per working age adult in the 1960s and 1970s, due to relatively faster productivity growth
dominating a relative decline in labor inputs.
Panel B shows that in the post-1980 reform era, UK productivity growth was roughly comparable
to rates in Germany and France, but the UK had stable or rising labor inputs while Germany, France and
most other European nations experienced continuing declines. Thus, the 0.8 percent per year faster
growth in UK GDP per working age adult relative to Germany or France in the 1980s and 1990s was
attributable almost entirely to the growth in labor inputs.  Again, the contrast with the US is different:
relative to the US, the UK had somewhat faster growing productivity but slower growth in labor inputs.   
Finally, Panel C shows that the UK accelerated its economic performance relative to West
Germany and France in the post-reform period.  Relative to Germany, the differential in GDP growth per
working age adult shifted from -0.63 percent per year in the pre-reform era to +0.84 percent per year in
the reform era, for a net relative gain of  1.47 percent per year. Regardless of whether labor inputs are
measured by employment or hours, most of this relative gain is attributable to the larger drop in
productivity in Germany and France than in the UK.  A fairly similar story emerges in the comparison to
France, although in this case a larger fraction of the UK’s relative improvement is attributable to a relative
gain in labor inputs in the UK.  Benchmarked to the US economy, however, the UK does not fare as well. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the UK had faster productivity growth than the US, but this was partially offset by21
relative declines in per capita labor inputs.  After 1979 productivity growth slowed down everywhere, but
more in the UK than in the US, though productivity growth rates were still faster in the UK (see Figures
3A and 4A).  This was only partially offset by the bigger turnaround in the trend toward declining work
activity in the UK.
Tables 9 and 10 show that the reform era coincided with a reversal of the faster growth in GDP
per working age adult in Germany and France than in the UK, due mainly to the slower deceleration in
productivity growth in the UK.  They also show that after 1979 UK labor productivity grew at about the
same rate as in Germany and France, but Britain had stable or slightly rising labor inputs per capita, while
Germany and France had declining labor inputs.  This relative rise in work effort led to higher growth
rates in British GDP per capita after 1979.  Finally, the tables show no apparent turnaround in UK
performance relative to the US.  Indeed, the comparison of the US to the UK has the same character as the
comparison of the UK to Germany/France.  The US had a smaller productivity slowdown than the UK
and a bigger rise in the rate of growth of labor inputs, with the net result that GDP per capita rose faster in
the US than the UK after 1979, whereas the opposite was true before 1979.
b.  Explanations for Differential Trends in Labor Productivity Growth
Much of the improvement in UK economic performance relative to Germany and France is
attributable to the closing of the gap in productivity growth rates.  Similarly, the worsened performance of
the UK compared to the US in the post-1979 period relative to earlier decades is due mainly to the
narrowing of productivity growth rate differentials.   In this section we consider three explanations for the
shifting trends in labour productivity growth: relative trends in the transition out of agriculture, relative
trends in the rate of growth of capital per unit of labor input; and relative trends in the quality of labor.
(i) The Shift Out of Agriculture
One widely recognized source of economic growth is the movement of labor from low
productivity sectors such as agriculture to more highly productive sectors such as manufacturing and22
16Appendix Table 3 presents employment shares in three sectors: agriculture, industry, and
services.
17That is the differential shift explains 0.3 to 0.4 percent per year of the 1.2 percent per year gap
in the growth in productivity per worker.
distribution (e.g. Feinstein, 1999).  By 1960, only 5 percent of workers in the UK were employed in
agriculture.  In West Germany and France, however, the fractions were 14 and 23 percent, respectively. 
The fall in agricultural employment in these countries in the 1960s and 1970s can explain some of their
rapid productivity growth in this period.  To the extent that the movement out of agriculture was complete
by the late 1970s, the slowdown in employment reallocation can also help explain the greater slowdown
in productivity growth experienced by Germany and France than the UK or the US.  Table 11 presents a
share-shift analysis of the effects of declining agricultural employment on aggregate productivity growth
rates in the pre-1979 and post-1979 periods.
16   To a first order approximation, the change in aggregate
productivity associated with a shift )S in the share of agricultural employment is !)S × (1!R), where R
is relative productivity in agriculture.  The entries in columns 4 and 5, drawn from sectoral productivity
data reported by van Ark (1996), show that R was about 33 percent in the UK and France, 18 percent in
Germany, and 60 percent in the US in the early 1960s.  In light of these differentials, the 8.7 percentage
point decline in the share of agricultural employment in Germany in the 1960-79 period contributed about
0.4 percent per year to the trend rate of growth of labor productivity, while the 14.4 percentage point
decline in France contributed about 0.5 percent per year.  By comparison, the much smaller shifts in the
UK and the US had negligible impacts on aggregate productivity (less than 0.1 percent per year).  In the
1979-98 period the contributions of the movement out of agriculture were small in all four countries, but
particularly in the UK and US.  These calculations suggest that the declining share of agricultural
employment can explain one-quarter to one- third of the faster productivity growth of Germany/France
than the UK in the pre-1979 period
17.  The slowdown in sectoral reallocation explains about the same
fraction of the 1.2-1.4 percentage point faster slowdown in productivity growth in Germany/France than23
18See e.g. Griliches (1970).  In this framework, sectoral shifts can be modeled as efficiency
improvements.
the UK after 1979.   As these effects are presumably independent of the reform process in the UK, we will
factor them out before attempting to evaluate the contribution of the UK reforms.
(ii) Changes in the Capital-labor Ratio
Standard growth accounting exercises decompose the growth rate of labor productivity into three
components: changes in the amount of capital available per unit of labor input; changes in the “quality” of
labor inputs; and technological change or other efficiency improvements.
18   Specifically, assuming a
constant returns to scale aggregate production function,
(1) ) log (Y/L)  .   "  ) log q   +   (1!")  ) log (K/L)    +    ) log A
where ) log x represents the logarithmic differential (or percentage change) in the variable x, Y/L
represents real output per unit of labor input, q is the relative quality of labor inputs, K/L represents real
capital per unit of labor input,  " represents labor’s share (the cost of labor inputs divided by the value of
output), and A is an index of overall efficiency.  Since different institutions and policies potentially affect
the accumulation of physical and human capital, and the rate of growth of technological efficiency, we
next decompose the shifts in the relative trends of UK labor productivity  into these three components.
Figure 4 plots the trends in capital per worker for the UK, West Germany, France, and the US
from 1960 to 1999, using data on real net physical capital stocks from Mary O’Mahoney.  To maximize
international comparability, O’Mahoney’s series use a consistent set of geometric depreciation factors. 
Similarly, for consistency with the practices in other countries, the underlying investment series for
computer related equipment in the US have been deflated by a traditional cost-based index, rather than by
the hedonic price index developed by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (see O’Mahoney,
1996, pp. 174-176).  Consequently, the growth rate of the US capital stock in the 1990s is somewhat24
19The capital series for all four countries are very highly correlated (r>0.99) with the series in the
OECD International Sectoral Database (1999 edition), and with an alternative set of series constructed
by O’Mahoney (1996) using somewhat different methods.
20Blanchard (1997) presents an interesting analysis of the sources of variation in labor’s share
over time.  In the UK, labor’s share of GDP was 65.9% in 1960, 69.0% in 1970, 68.5% in 1980, 65.9% in
19990, and 62.3% in 1996 (Office of National Statistics, 1997, Table 1.4).
21Recall from Table 9 that in the 1960-79 period labor inputs per capita grew a little faster in the
UK than in Germany or France.  So investment per capita grew slightly faster in the UK too. 
slower than shown by official BEA data.
19   The data in Figure 4 show that the growth rate in capital per
worker was faster in all three European countries than in the US both before and after 1979.  UK growth
rates in capital per worker are very similar to those in West Germany, but slower than those in France in
the 1980s and early 1990s.
If labor’s share is constant, then equation (1) implies that we can adjust the observed growth in
labor productivity for the effects of  rising capital per unit of labor input by subtracting (1!") times the
growth rate in capital per unit of labor.  This exercise is carried out in Table 12.  As in previous tables, we
consider two measures of labor input: employment, and total hours.  The first three columns of the table
reproduce the estimated trends in GDP per unit of labor input from the middle of Table 9.  Columns 4-6
show the corresponding trends in capital per unit of labor.  Finally, columns 7-9 report estimates of
productivity growth rates in the pre-reform and post-reform eras, adjusted for changing capital intensity.  
In these calculations we use an estimate of labor’s share of 0.65 for all four countries.  In view of this
over-simplification, the estimates in columns 7-9 should be interpreted as rough guides to the adjusted
productivity growth rates that would emerge from a more detailed calculation.
20
We draw three conclusions from Table 12.  First, the growth rates in capital per unit of labor were
similar in the UK, West Germany, and France in the pre-1979 period.  Thus, the relatively slow rate of
UK productivity growth in the pre-reform period does not reflect a shortfall in investment relative to
employment growth.
21  Second, in all three countries the growth in capital per unit of labor input slowed
dramatically after 1979.  In the reform era capital per unit of labor input grew at about the same pace in25
the UK as in West Germany (especially when labor input is measured on an hours basis), and somewhat
slower than in France.  Based on these comparisons, we believe that investment is not the primary
mechanism behind the gains in UK productivity growth relative to its European competitors in the period
of market reforms.  For example, using an hours-based measure of labor inputs, the UK had a 1.21
percent per year gain in the rate of growth of productivity relative to West Germany after 1979 (see Panel
C of Table 10).  After adjusting for the impact of changing trends in capital per hour, the relative gain was
1.10 (!0.15+1.25).  Similarly, the gain relative to France in the growth of productivity per hour was 1.21
percentage points per year: after adjusting for shifting trends in capital per hour, the relative gain was
slightly larger (1.43= !0.15+1.58).  
But changing trends in capital growth per unit of labor input go a long way toward explaining the
changing relative trends in productivity growth between the UK and the US.  Capital accumulation per
worker slowed less in the US than in the UK (or Germany/France), and after adjusting for this fact, the
trend rates of growth of productivity are very similar in the UK and US.  Using an hours-based measure
of labor input, the trend growth rate in productivity in the UK net of capital was 1.57 percent per year in
1960-79, compared to a rate of 1.41 percent per year in the US.  In 1979-99 the trend growth in UK
productivity net of capital was 1.42 percent per year compared to 1.40 percent per year in the US.  Thus,
the changing relative trends in productivity growth between the two countries are well explained by the
changing relative trends in capital per worker.
(iii) Changes in Labor Quality
A final source of growth in labor productivity is rising labor quality, driven by increases in
educational attainment or shifts in other skill characteristics of the labor force.  Available data suggests
that the rise in formal education qualifications was bigger in the UK than in Germany (e.g., Broadberry
and Wagner, 1996), although the disappearance of the apprenticeship system in the UK (Blanchflower
and Lynch, 1994) suggests that Britain has fallen behind other European countries in one area of skill26
22In practice, we constructed weighted averages that weight each worker by his or her relative
hours of work.
formation.  We evaluate the impact of changing labor quality on productivity by: 1) estimating a micro-
level wage equation which relates individual earnings to observed characteristics such as education,
vocational qualifications, gender, and age; and 2) by using the estimated coefficients in a base year to
evaluate the changes in the relative quality of the labor force by calculating average predicted wages for
workers in two different years, and forming the ratio of these averages (see Griliches, 1970).
22  This
method weights  changes in different characteristics by the same market metric (relative earnings) that
underlies the construction of GDP statistics.  A problem is that coefficients from different base years will
give different estimates of the change in labor quality when the market returns to different skill
characteristics change over time.
We use different data sets for different countries in this analysis. For the UK, there is no single
micro data source that spans the past four decades.  The best available source is the General Household
Survey (GHS), which has sampled roughly 10,000 workers each year from 1974 onward, and includes
detailed information on both academic and vocational qualifications.  We use GHS data to estimate
changing labor quality in the UK over the period from 1975 to 1996.  For the US, the March Current
Population Survey (CPS) provides annual data from 1967 onward.  Comparable data were collected in the
1960 Census.  Pooling there data sources it is possible to construct estimates of changing labor quality in
the US economy over the 1959-99 period.  For Germany there are no publically available data sets
comparable to the GHS or CPS.  The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) provides micro data for a
fixed panel of households starting in the early 1980s.  Detailed cross-tabulations of the age, education,
and gender distribution of the German labor force (based on the Mikrozensus) are available irregularly
starting in 1976.  We use a combination of the GSOEP micro data (to estimate the coefficients) and the
Mikrozensus cross-tabulations to estimate changes in West German labor force quality over the period
from 1976 to 1999.  We drop France from our analysis due to the absence of publicly available micro data27
23We use this for comparability with the German model, which is fit to 1985 GSOEP data.  Use of
estimated coefficients from earlier years give slightly slower rates of growth, since the wage disadvantage
for women is higher and the return to education is lower.  Estimates from later years give higher rates of
growth of quality.
24The education categories are: a regular university degree (or more); a technical college degree; a
“meister” (master craftsman) qualification; a completed apprenticeship; and a residual category that
includes those with only a high school education and those who started but did not finish a post-
secondary program.  The 1999 cross-tabulations include all of Germany.  This may lead to some
downward bias in the trend in education over the 1980-99 period.  Over the 1980-89 period the trends is
similar to that observed over the longer period.
sets on labor skills and earnings over time.
Table 13 summarizes our estimates of the relative rates of change in the quality of labor in the
UK, West Germany, and the US.   For the UK, our micro level wage model includes a measure of years
of total schooling, dummies for three levels of academic qualifications (university degree, A-levels, 3 or
more O-levels), dummies for three levels of vocational qualifications, and dummies for ten 5-year age
categories, fully interacted with gender.  The estimates in Table 13 use coefficients from a model fit to
1984-86 data.
23  The implied rates of growth in labor quality are about 0.2 percentage points per year in
the late 1970s and 0.9 percentage points per year in the 1980s and 1990s.  The relatively rapid pace of
quality growth in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a substantial rise in average education among UK workers
(+1.75 years from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s) coupled with rises in the fractions of workers with
university degrees and vocational qualifications (see Appendix Table 4).  Offsetting these gains was a 10
percentage point rise in the fraction of women.  Since women earn substantially less than men, this trend
has slowed down the growth of labor force quality in the UK.
For West Germany, our wage determination model includes a full set of interactions of gender
with eleven 5-year age categories and five education categories.  These 110 cells represent the finest level
of detail available in published cross-tabulations of age, education, and gender from the Mikrozensus.
24  
Compared to the UK, the rate of growth of labor quality in West Germany was relatively high in the late
1970s but much slower in the 1980s and 1990s.   This is because the distribution of workers across28
education categories in Germany changed only modestly, while fraction of female workers increased from
38 percent in 1980 to 43 percent in 1999.
For the US our wage determination model includes years of education, a dummy for a college
degree, dummies for nonwhite race and Hispanic ethnicity, and full interactions of gender with ten age
categories.  Over the 1959-79 period we estimate that the average quality of the US workforce rose by
about 0.3 percent per year.  The main contributors were a rise in average education (from 10.5 to 12.4
years) and in the fraction of workers with a college degree (from 8.8 to 17.5 percent).  Working against
this trend were a rise in the fraction of young workers (from 31 percent under the age of 31 to 41 percent)
and a 10 percentage point rise in the fraction of women (from 35 to 45 percent).   Over the 1980s and
1990s our model suggests that labor force quality growth was a little faster than in the 1960s and 1970s,
despite a slowdown in the rate of growth of average years of education.  Contributing factors were a drop
in the fraction of young workers and a dramatic slowdown in the entry of women.
The key conclusion from Table 13 is that labor force quality grew faster in the UK in the post-
1979 reform era than in West Germany or the US.  The differential relative to Germany is 0.66 percentage
points per year.  Assuming that labor’s share is 65 percent, this gap would be expected to lead to about
0.4 percentage points per year faster growth in labor productivity in the UK than in Germany.   A similar
calculation suggests that relative improvements in labor force quality contributed to a 0.3 percentage
point per year difference in productivity growth relative to the US.   Since column 8 of table 12 shows
that  labor productivity adjusted for trends in capital grew at about the same rate in all three countries in
the 1979-98 period, the implication is that UK productivity growth net of labor quality growth was slower
than expected in the reform era, relative to Germany and the US.  The absence of data on the
characteristics of UK and German workers in the 1960s, preclude any definitive assessment  of whether
shifts in the trend growth in labor quality can account for the bigger slowdown in productivity growth in
West Germany than Britain.  Extrapolating from limited data for  the late 1970s, it appears that the
growth rate of labor force quality accelerated in the UK and declined in Germany after 1979/80.  These29
25The calculations for trends in productivity per worker are similar.
patterns are consistent with the relative changes in productivity growth rates.
(iv) Summary of Changing Trends in Productivity Growth
Table 14 summarizes our attempt to decompose productivity growth in the UK, West Germany,
France, and the US into components attributable to the movement out of agriculture, the rise in capital per
unit of labor input, and changing labor quality.  For simplicity, we focus on trends in productivity per
hour
25.   Sectoral shifts out of agriculture help explain some of the more rapid productivity growth of
France and Germany relative to the UK (or US) prior to 1979.  After 1979, most of the adjustment was
complete, leading to a bigger productivity slowdown for France and Germany than the UK or US. 
Increasing capital per unit of labor is an important component of productivity growth in all countries. 
Trend rates of capital growth are similar in the UK, Germany, and France, however, suggesting that
relative investment trends have not been a major source of differential productivity growth among these
three countries.  The slowdown in capital accumulation was smaller in the US, and an adjustment for
capital brings the productivity trends in the US and the UK into close alignment.
Adjusting for sectoral shifts and capital trends, the productivity growth rate in the UK in the
1960-79 period was 1.5 percent per year – 0.7 to 0.9 percent per year lower than in West Germany or
France, but 0.2 percent per year higher than in the US.  Given the limitations of the available data we are
unable to estimate how much of the gap between the UK and its major European competitors was due to
slower growth in labor quality: we suspect this may be a part of the story for the UK-Germany
differential.  After 1979 adjusted UK productivity growth was 1.4 percent per year – only slightly below
the rate in the previous decades, and about equal to the rates in Germany, France, and the US.   We
estimate that the UK had somewhat faster growth in labor quality than Germany or the US in the 1980s
and 1990s.  The growth rate in productivity in the UK attributable to efficiency gains, technological30
change, and other unobserved factors was therefore slower than in West Germany or the US.
The bottom line is that while the various factors that we have examined explain some of the
improved relative performance of the UK in the era of market reforms, there still remains an upswing in
the growth of GDP per working age adult (and per capita) in the UK compared to its major EU
competitors.
3.  Relating Reforms to Performance
Did the economic reforms adopted in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s cause the changes in
economic performance documented in the previous section?  Given the complexity and overlapping
nature of the reforms, and the difficulty of specifying what would have happened in the UK economy in
the absence of reform, this is a difficult question.  Rather than attempt to answer it, we address a more
modest question: is there a plausible link between some of the major reforms and the economic changes
we have identified?   Our analysis highlights two key facets of the change in the economic performance of
the British economy after 1979:
1.  (Productivity).  Pre-1979, UK productivity growth was about 1 percent per year slower than in
Germany or France (net of sectoral shifts).  After 1979 the gap disappeared.  None of the
convergence is explained by trends in capital accumulation; some may be due to rising labor
quality in the UK.  After adjusting for trends in capital accumulation, trends in relative
productivity growth in the UK and US were very similar before and after 1979.
2.  (Work Effort).  Pre-1979, employment rates and hours per capita were declining more slowly
in the UK than Germany/France.  After 1979 this difference widened, contributing to faster
growth in GDP per capita.  Although work effort rose relative to Germany and France, it has not
kept pace with trends in the US.
Potential explanations for the productivity results include reforms that lowered barriers to
productivity growth in the UK, or that generated once-for-all increases in the productivity of UK31
businesses.  Potential explanations for the work effort results include reforms that increased the incentives
for work in the UK relative to continental Europe.
a.  Productivity-enhancing Reforms
Many UK policy reforms could have contributed to rising labor productivity, including laws that
have weakened the coverage and power of trade unions, leading to changes in union policies;
privatization of nationalized industries; the creation of incentives for self employment and share
ownership.  
Some of the most prominent early reforms introduced by Mrs. Thatcher were designed to reduce
trade union power.  The Employment Acts of 1980, 1982, and 1984 limited secondary picketing,
abolished statutory union recognition procedures, weakened the closed shop, and mandated changes to
internal union governance (including compulsory pre-strike balloting).  In addition, other government
actions, such as the privatization of highly unionized state-owned industries and the removal of contract
requirements to pay union-negotiated wages, substantially weakened the government’s indirect support
for unionism and collective bargaining (Pencavel, 2002).   Union membership rates, which had reached a
peak of over 50 percent in 1980, declined steadily in the subsequent decades and by 1999 stood at under
30 percent of wage and salary workers (see Appendix Table 5).  Strike activity plummeted in the 1980s
(Pencavel, 2002).  The presence of multiple unions in the same work place, which contributed to some of
the worst excesses of British industrial relations in the pre-1980 period, also fell.  The evidence shows
that the relationship between productivity and collective bargaining shifted in this period.  Using data
from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) conducted in 1998 , Pencavel (2002) concludes
that by the end of the 1990s unionized establishments were no less productive on average than their
nonunion counterparts.  By comparison, Pencavel’s analysis of similar data from the 1990 WIRS, and
studies by other researchers (e.g., Machin, Stewart, and van Reenan, 1993) suggest that unionized
establishments suffered a significant productivity disadvantage in earlier years.   32
26One way in which unions might in theory have reduced labor productivity is by causing firms to
invest less through a “hold-up” effect: a unionized firm that invests in new equipment can expect to have
to pay higher wages in the future, thereby reducing the effective return on capital (Grout 1984).  Our
evidence gives no indication that this occurred in the UK.  Despite the decline in unionization rates in the
UK, and the apparent shift toward more co-operative relations with employers, the rate of growth of
capital per worker (or capital per hour) did not accelerate in the UK relative to West Germany or France. 
Either the under-investment effect was relatively small before the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, or de-
unionization and an improved industrial relations climate have had little effect on the investment calculus
of British employers.
These findings suggest that reforms linked to reductions in trade union power had some impact
on measured UK productivity.  For example, if the 43 percent of private sector employees in 1979 that
were working in unionized establishments had 10 percent lower productivity than other workers, then the
elimination of the union productivity gap could contribute to a 4.3 percentage point gain in aggregate
productivity between 1979 and 1999.  Some analysts have argued that the changed industrial relations
climate in the UK has led to a permanent shift in the productivity growth rate (Bean and Crafts, 1996).  
However, the empirical analysis on this is relatively limited (see Pencavel, 2002), and we regard the 4.3
percentage point gain over the entire period as a generous upper bound on the potential gains associated
with elimination of the negative productivity effect of trade unions.
26  
 What about the effect of privatization of industries on productivity?  In 1979 12% of UK GDP
was produced in publicly owned companies; in 1997, just 2% of UK GDP was produced in publicly
owned companies.  While, as Haskell and Green (2002) show, productivity growth was not the primary
impetus for privatization in the early Thatcher years, the widespread belief that private businesses operate
more efficiently than state-run businesses suggests that privatization of this magnitude could have
contributed to the improvement in relative productivity in the 1970s-1990s.  Their industry-level evidence
shows that privatization per se had no large effect on productivity, but that in many cases productivity
increased in the period before privatization as the government sought to improve operations in order to
make the business attractive to the private sector.  Labor productivity between 1980 and 1992 went up for
plants that were public in 1980 and private in 1992, with the increase concentrated in the period33
27Our 1.2% estimate comes from taking the 1992-1980 rate of productivity growth in the plants
that moved from public to private of .44 log points, subtracting the 1992-1980 productivity growth of
private plants (.27 log points) to obtain a privatization boon of .17 log points, which is 19%.  Multiplying
this by the 6 percentage point shift gives an estimate of 1.1%.
immediately preceding privatization.  They, and other analysts, have stressed that increased competition
after privatization appears to be the key factor differentiating sectors where privatization was associated
with improved productivity and sectors where it was associated with stagnation or declines in
productivity relative to private firms or international benchmarks.
To get a rough estimate of how much this might have added to aggregate productivity growth, we
assume, as they do, that the process of privatization accounts for this improvement.  Appendix Table 7
shows that 1.4% of the UK workforce was employed in nationalized industries in 1995 compared to 7.3%
of the UK workforce in 1975, which indicates that privatization shifted nearly 6% of the work force from
the public to private sector.  While there is no single “best” estimate of the effect of privatization on
productivity, a generous estimate based on Haskell and Green’s plant data (Table 6, labour productivity
line) is that privatization induced a gain in labour productivity of nearly 20% above the private sector
increase.   This would imply an increase in aggregate productivity of 1.1% between 1979 and 1999.
27  We
regard this as a generous upper bound on the potential gains associated with privatization since it gives all
of the privatized sectors the 19% gain, whereas productivity did not in fact improve in some industries.
Another area where the UK has made major micro market-oriented changes is in the introduction
of various “shared compensation” programs which give employees a stake in the firm performs, either
through profit-sharing or share ownership.   Evidence in Conyon and Freeman (2001) shows that
productivity is higher in firms that have such programs compared to those that do not have such
programs.  Not all of the programs that the UK government has favoured with tax relief have a positive
impact on productivity, but the most important programs -- the approved profit sharing scheme introduced
in the 1978 Finance Act, which the government replaced with an all-employee share plan in 2000 -- has
an estimated productivity effect in the area of 10% (Canyon and Freeman, 2002, Exhibit 5c, based on34
28Inland Revenue Service, Employee Share Schemes and Profit-Related Pay: Table 6.1
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/stats/ gives the number of workers who actually received payments
under various schemes.  225,000 received payments in 1979 under the Finance Act of that year compared
to 960,000 in 1907-98, but an additional 1,170,000 employees were granted options under the Finance
Act of 1980.  Since workers may be covered by plans but not receive payments in a given year, these data
show a big trend but smaller magnitudes than in the establishment survey.  
29We base this estimate by multiplying the 10% productivity effect by the 20 point increase in the
proportion of workers covered by profit-sharing option plans. 
stock market returns) to 18% (exhibit 4, based on production function estimates).   Millward, Bryson, and
Forth (2000, Table 6.13) show that there was an increase in the proportion of industry and commerce
establishments with 25 or more employees having profit-sharing plans from 19% in 1984 to 46% in 1998. 
Inland Revenue data also show a large increase in the number of workers who received tax advantaged
payments under government approved profit-related schemes.  In 1979 approximately one quarter as
many workers were likely to have been covered by plans.
28  On the basis of the establishment surveys and
Inland Revenue data, we estimate that the proportion of British workers covered by these plans increased
by approximately 20 percentage points.  This implies a gain in productivity gain on the order of 2.0% to
as high as 3.8%.
29 
The British reforms also encouraged workers to become self-employed.   Appendix Table 6
shows that  the proportion of the work force in the UK that was self-employed rose from 8.4% in 1980 to
13.1% in 1990, and then stabilized.  Over the entire period, the proportion self-employed rose by 4.3
percentage points.   In general, self-employed workers earn less than wage and salary workers, with about
a 10% differential between the two.  Interpreting this differential as the result of differences in
productivity, the implication is that this reform reduced productivity by 0.4 percent.  By contrast, the
percentage of workers who were self-employed in Germany and the US fell over this period, with the
decline in German self-employment due largely to the drop in agricultural employment.
Summing up the estimated effects on productivity of the change in the relation between unionism
and productivity (4.3%) , privatization (1.1%), profit and share ownership schemes (2.0%) and self-35
employment (-0.4%), we estimate the micro-evidence of the effect of particular reforms on productivity
may have raised UK productivity on the order of 7% or approximately 0.35% per year, which is about
one quarter of  the difference in growth rates between the pre-reform 1960-79 and the 1979-99 reform
period shown in part C of Table 10, and a potentially higher proportion of growth rates adjusted for the
improved quality of the work force.   These estimates are, to be sure, crude.  They are based solely on
changes in the UK rather than changes in the UK relative to other countries, though we have seen that the
UK reforms were considerably greater than those in France, Germany, and the US.   What we conclude is
that the estimated effects of the micro-reforms cumulate to an order of magnitude that suggests that they
explain part of the acceleration in UK productivity growth compared to Germany or France. 
b.  Reforms in the Incentives for Work
Many  important reforms have affected the economic incentives for work in the UK relative to
other advanced countries, including West Germany and France.  These include changes that lowered the
generosity and availability of unemployment benefits; taxation of various previously untaxed socially
provided benefits, elimination of the earnings-related supplement, suspension of indexing of benefit
levels for several years in the 1980s, elimination of unemployment benefits for young people,
establishment of the ReStart and later New Deal programs to monitor job search effort of benefit
claimants (van Reenan, 2002); lowering of marginal tax rates; and the introduction of the Family Credit in
1988 and ensuing 1999 Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) to improve the work incentives for
families with low incomes (Hoynes and Blundell, 2002); reforms in pensions designed to increase labor
mobility.  The Thatcher era reforms sought to increase the incentive to work (Blanchflower and Freeman,
1993) and ensuing reforms had a similar intent.  If these reforms exceeded those in France and Germany,
they might help explain the improved employment rate in the UK versus those (and other) advanced
OECD countries. 
Consistent with the picture given by our indices on the labor market (Tables 5 and 6), it appears36
30See OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1996, chapter 2, and  Atkinson and Mickelwright
(1999).  The most recent work covering the US tells a similar story, see Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and 
Deschenes (1999).
that in some dimensions that might affect employment, the UK did indeed undertake greater market-
oriented changes than other advanced countries. Table 15 shows that from 1965-72 to 1988-95 the UK
reduced the average replacement rate of the unemployment benefit system (the ratio of unemployment
benefits to the previous wage) by more than any other country, so that by the 1990s it had the lowest rate
among covered countries.  Because unemployed workers receive other benefits – housing subsidies, child
support, and so on – the reduction in support is arguably less than that indicated by the fall in the
replacement rate.  Still, the table captures the greater effort by the UK than most other countries to reduce
the disincentive to work.  Studies that look at the impact of changes in the replacement rate and other
measures of unemployment  benefit on unemployment or employment show that reforms that lessen the
payoff and in particular the length of access to benefits tend to increase employment, though only
modestly.
30 
Hoynes and Blundell (2002) have examined the shift in UK welfare support toward “in-work”
benefits.  By shifting support to working families, the WFTC reform should also increase employment. 
They show, however, that any such effects are relatively small, in large part because UK in-work benefits
are counted as income for other benefits, notably rent rebates under the Housing Benefit, so that the effect
of these reforms on incentives to work were relatively modest.  In addition, the UK increased the
generosity of other welfare programs at the same time, further reducing the employment incentive in these
reforms.  The result is that very little of the rise in the employment rate of women can be plausibly related
to these changes. Van Reenan’s (2002) analysis of the New Deal programme initiated by the Labour
Government gives a similar picture of modest impacts of reforms on employment.  In this case, the
combination of assistance in job search, wage subsidies to employers, education and training coupled
with time limited benefits produced an estimated gain of 17,000 employed young persons – a modest37
amount in an economy with some 27 million workers in 2000.  
Some might argue that the decline in union power and increase in inequality that the various
labour market reforms helped bring about may have contributed to the expansion of employment.  Since
unionisation fell rapidly in manufacturing, where employment was decimated, it is difficult to make any
sectoral link between changes in union power and growth of jobs.  On the wage side, the fact that real
wages in the UK rose throughout the 1980s and 1990s makes it hard to tell a story in which declining
wages created employment.  Similarly, the fact that groups and sectors where wages increased the most
had the biggest increase in employment also raises doubts about any simple micro reform-job creation
story.  The biggest problem in assessing the contribution of the reforms on employment from micro
studies is, of course, that the macro-performance of the British economy dominates overall employment
patterns.  In the 1980s through the early 1990s the UK had relatively high unemployment despite the
various economic reforms because of poor macro-economic policy and outcomes.  The adverse effects of
high and rising unemployment masked any positive effects of micro-institutional changes on labor market
outcomes.  From the mid 1990s to early 2000s the employment-creating effects of an extended boom
dominated any impacts of micro-reforms on outcomes.  If the market-oriented policy reforms in the
labour market contributed to the length and extent of the economic expansion they would indeed help
explain the good performance of the UK in employment in this period, but such a contribution cannot be
readily determined from micro-economic data.
c.  An alternative approach
There is another way to assess the impact of the UK reforms on economic performance.  This is
to relate country-level economic performance to indicators of market-oriented institutions and policies
such as the Fraser Institute Index (FII), and then use the estimated coefficients to estimate how much the
UK reforms affected UK outcomes.  As with other cross-country analyses, this procedure has some
advantages and disadvantages.  On the plus side, it provides a statistical assessment of purported effects38
of reforms, with an explicit counterfactual posed by the economic performance of countries that did not
change their regulatory stance.  Using the Fraser Institute data from 1970 to 1995 we can estimate models
that include country specific fixed effects, thus focusing on the effects of country-specific changes in the
regulations and institutional features summarized in the FII.   On the negative side, this method does not
isolate the effects of reforms in the UK per se.  Rather, the estimated coefficients will reflect the
combined experience of all the countries that undertook substantial free market reforms, including those
that have not done particularly well in recent decades, like New Zealand.  Pro-market reforms may have
been the right medicine for the UK but not for New Zealand.  Or, reforms in countries like New Zealand
may have been overpowered by other forces.  Still, it is useful to examine what such an analysis shows
about the impact of reforms similar to those adopted in the UK on advanced countries in general.   
Table 16 records the coefficients and standard errors for a set of cross-country regressions of the
level and growth of various macro-economic outcomes on the Fraser Institute Indexes reported in Table
1.   Since the FII is reported every five years, the calculations relate to five year intervals starting in 1970.
When the dependent variable is the log of the level of an outcome, it refers to average over the same five
year period. When the dependent variable is the log change in the outcome, it refers to the ensuing five
year period: thus, the FII for 1970 is related to the change from 1970 to 1975.  For 1995, the change
relates to 1995-1999, adjusted to allow for the fact that this change covers 4 rather than 5 years.  
Each line in the table comes from a separate regression.  The odd numbered regressions include
unrestricted year effects, and are effectively pooled cross-sectional comparisons across countries with
different levels of the FII.  The even numbered regressions include both year and country dummies: these
models relate changes in the dependent variable to changes in the FII within countries, while controlling
for average changes across countries that had no change in the value of the FII.   
The odd-numbered estimates that have the dependent variable in levels show that countries with
greater market freedoms have  higher GDP per capita, higher productivity per employee, and higher
employment per adult in the population.  In part this reflects the fact that the countries with the highest39
FII scores include the US and Canada while those with the lowest scores include Portugal and Greece.  
By comparison, the odd-numbered estimates with the dependent variable in differences suggest that
countries with higher values of the FII have slower growth in GDP per capita and GDP per worker. 
Again, this presumably reflects that growth rates have tended to be slowest in countries like the US and
Canada with higher values of the FII, and faster in countries like Portugal and Greece.
Arguably, more weight should be given to the estimates in the even-number rows, which include
country dummies, and therefore reflect the effects of reforms on the levels or growth rates of the macro
outcomes, relative to past levels or growth rates in the same country.  Examination of these estimates
suggests that reforms have moderate positive effects on the growth in employment per capita, but no
systematic effect on any of the other outcome variables.  This is consistent with the evidence that the UK
reforms contributed to the country‘s improved employment record but raises some doubt about the impact
of the reforms on productivity.  The weakness of the cross country evidence means that the case for a
linkage between market-oriented reform and productivity growth must rest on the kinds of UK-specific
micro-level analyses conducted in Green and Haskell (2002), Conyon and Freeman (2002), and Pencavel
(2002).
4.  Conclusion
This paper has examined two main facets of recent British experience: the market-oreinted
reforms that the UK undertook in the 1980s and 1990s;  and the relative economic progress of the country
compared to other advanced countries.  The evidence shows that the UK made greater market reforms
than most other advanced countries and that it arrested the nearly century-long trend pattern of decline
relative to its historic competitors, Germany and France.  It is difficult to link the reforms to the improved
economic performance relative to these other countries, but at the minimum our analysis has shown the
change in the UK economy cannot be readily explained by standard macro-economic changes in labor or
capital.   Related studies present some of the more micro-based evidence that we used to judge the40
contribution of the reforms, and examine some of the accompanying costs.  Absent a unequivocal
counterfactual of what would have happened had UK not proceeded with its reforms, we cannot
definitively judge the market reforms, though weighing the diverse evidence, they do seem to have played
a positive role in aggregate economic growth. 41
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Table 1: Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Ratings: 
the UK and other Advanced OECD Economies in 1970-1999
        Change
           1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999          1980-1999   
United Kingdom       64  63  66  79  84  87  88 22
[Rank out of 22] [19] [13] [15] [5] [2] [2] [2] [2]
Major Comparisons:
Germany  80 73 77 77 81 80 80   3
France  72 60 63 63 76 79 75 12
US 77 80 84 85 88 87 87   3
Other Developed Countries:
Australia 80 65 74 78 80 84 85 11
Austria  71 60 67 67 74 76 80 13
Belgium 91 75 78 79 80 82 79 1
Canada 80 73 79 81 84 80 82 3
Denmark 72 63 65 67 77 80 80 15
Finland 77 62 69 72 76 79 81 12
Greece 63 58 57 52 61 72 73 16
Ireland 68 61 66 67 73 86 85 19
Italy 68 54 56 59 72 72 78 22
Japan 73 69 75 76 81 81 79 4
Luxembourg 91 91 89 92 82 83 84 -5
Netherlands 85 71 78 79 82 84 84 6
New Zealand 69 56 64 63 80 90 89 25
Norway 69 57 60 67 76 79 78 18
Portugal 58 33 56 56 64 79 78 22
Spain 67 59 61 63 69 80 76 14
Sweden 57 56 61 67 73 79 79 18
Switzerland 88 79 83 86 84 83  85 2      
Notes: A higher score denotes a more favorable ranking.  In several cases, the UK is tied with one or
more other countries at the particular rank.
Source: Data from Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of The World 2001 Annual Report  web-site
www.fraserinstitute.ca..  The figures in this edition differ somewhat from those in earlier editions, as the
Fraser Institute updated its estimates for earlier years, as well as adding 1999 data.    46
Table 2: Indicators of  Freedom in Markets in UK and other Advanced Economies 1980-1999
                        Structure of 
          Economy and       Legal Structure/          Freedom in Capital    
         Use of Markets     Property Rights           Financial Markets            Unweighted Average*   
          1980      1999      1980 1999 1980 1999            1980     1999    Change
UK 33 77 82  99 81 100 65 92 27
[Rank out [13] [3] [14] [1] [7] [1] [9]  [3] [4]
 of 22]
Major Comparisons:
Germany 43 49 91  99 76 81 70 76  6
France 35 47 79  86 71 81 62 71  9
US 53 81 100  98 92 93 82 91  9
Other Developed Countries: 
Australia 50 66 85 98 67 93 67 86 19
Austria  24 53 96 99 55 85 58 79 21
Belgium 33 51 93 87 91 91 72 76  4
Canada 60 79 84 96 93 92 79 89 10
Denmark 33 51 84 99 83 98 67 83 16
Finland 42 57 79 100 68 87 63 81 18
Greece 21 49 62  58 35 73 39 60 21
Ireland 51 79 82  97 67 83 67 86 19
Italy 21 50 63 90 50 82 45 74 29
Japan 53 54 94  94 62 73 70 74  4
Luxembourg – 68 100 100 100 92 – – – 
Netherlands 41 73 88  99 91 96 73 89 16
New Zealand 37 92 96  98 58 93 64 94 30
Norway 21 55 82  96 59 88 48 80 32
Portugal 10 55 95 81 35 80 47 72 25
Spain 25 46 72  75 67 85 55 69 14
Sweden 24 57 76  95 61 87 54 80 26
Switzerland 72 74 97 98 75 85 81 86  5
Notes:  A higher score denotes a more favorable ranking.  Source:  Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom of
The World 2001 Annual Report. 
* The three indices that we have selected are weighted in the Fraser Index as follows:
(II) Structure of the Economy and Use of Markets (14.2%); (V) Legal Structure and Property Rights
(16.6%); (VII) Freedom of Exchange in Capital and Financial Markets (17.2%).  Thus, they make up
approximately half of the overall index.  Their weights are sufficiently similar that our treating the three
equally does not produce markedly different results than if we had used the Institutes’s weighting scheme. 47
Table 3: Rank of UK and Other Advanced Countries in Economic Competitiveness 2000
Selected Sub-Indices






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UK 7 8 2 6 17 20
France 18 14 13 7 2 8
Germany 12 3 19 14 7 11
US 1 2 14 9 6 18
Australia 9 9 11 8 12 9
Austria 15 12 17 5 8 1
Belgium 14 11 19 11 14 6
Canada 6 10 12 15 9 12
Denmark 11 6 8 3 4 10
Finland 5 1 1 2 1 3
Greece 21 21 21 21 21 22
Ireland 4 17 16 13 22 4
Italy 22 19 22 22 20 17
Japan 17 13 5 19 13 13
Luxembourg 2 -- 3 1 5 2
Netherlands 3 4 15 4 11 7
New Zealand 16 15 6 10 15 14
Norway 13 16 7 16 16 15
Portugal 19 20 20 20 19 21
Spain 20 18 18 17 18 19
Sweden 10 7 9 18 10 16
Switzerland 8 5 4 12 3 5
SOURCE: World Economic Forum / Harvard Center for International Development, The Global
Competitiveness Report 2000: (1) growth competitiveness ranking, Table 1; (2) current competitiveness
index ranking, Table 2; (3) time with government bureaucracy,  p. 246; (4) Protection of property rights
(property rights are clearly delineated and protected by the law) p. 240; (5) Overall infrastructure (the
quality of the infrastructure is among the best in the world) p. 256; (6) public-funded schools (the public
schools are of high quality)  p. 268.48
Table 4: Country Regulatory Policies of UK and other Advanced Economies, 
Indices from OECD 1998 Regulatory Data Base
                                                  Inward Oriented Regulations:                                 Outward-oriented    
                                                          Barriers to                                                          Regulations:
              State                   Entrepre-    Admin.    Econ.                    Barriers to             TOTAL PRODUCT
            Control                   neurship      Regs.      Regs.      TOTAL           Trade/Invest.            MARKET REGS.
                                (1)        (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)   (7) 
UK  55 48  50  60  50 43  50
[Rank out            [1]    [1]  [1]  [1]  [1] [1]  [1]      
  Of 21]
Major Competitors:
Germany           176 210 270 140 190 54 140
France               263 273 310 230 270 103 210
US                      85 126   70 100 110 87 100
Ireland                94 120 150  80  80 43  80
Other Developed Countries:
Australia 126 113 110 130 120 43  90
Austria 211 160 160 210 118 54 140
Belgium 278 255 300 240 270            63 190
Canada 129  80  90 110 100               215 150
Denmark 246 132 110 230 190 54 140
Finland 268 193 220 210 230 63 170
Greece 387 166 200 310 270               132 220
Italy 392 274 300 350 330 49 230 
Japan 129 233 270 140 180               102 150
Nether 228 141 150 210 180 54 140
Norway 319 133 140 270 220 215 220
New Zealand 166 121 150 140  140 95 130
Portugal 283 146 150 250 210 107 170
Spain 259 177 230 210 220 68 160
Sweden 151 180 200 130 170 84 140
Switzerland 208 224 260 190 220                  132  180
Notes: A higher score indicates more burdensome or complex regulations.  Source: Nicoletti, Scarpetta,
and Boylaud, 1999.  Data on state control (column 1) from Table A3-1.  Data on barriers to
entrepreneurship (column 2) from Table A3-2.  Data on administrative regulations (column 3) from Table
A3-4.  Data on economic regulations (column 4) from Table A3-5.  Data on total inward oriented policies
(column 5) from Table A3-6.  Data on barriers to trade and foreign investment (column 6) from Table
A3-3.  Data on total product market regulations (column 7) from Table A3-7.49
Table 5: Ranking of Advanced Countries 
in Centralization/Decentralization in Wage Setting (Higher=More Centralized)
 Early 1980s                  Mid 1980s            
 Late 
1980s
     
              1990s       
  Change
1980s to     
1990s
1979 1981 1984 1984 1986 1986 1988 1990 1991 1995 (coded 1-3)
Australia 10 - 9 3 3 10 8 - 4 7 2,1988+,1
Austria 16 15 16 15 17 16 17 10 18 17 3
Belgium 8 9 15 10 9 6 10 - 10 11 2
Canada 1 5 5 3 2 5 1 - 2 3 1
Denmark 13 12 13 10 11 12 14 - 14 17 3
Finland 12 12 14 10 10 8 13 - 11 17 3 -> 2
France 5 3 2 18 5 3 7 3 7 11 2
Germany 9 8 11 10 16 15 12 6 12 14 3
Italy 3 1 6 6 4 1 5 4 6 7 1,1992+,3
Japan 6 - 3 18 8 14 4 11 9 11 1
Netherlands 7 10 12 15 15 9 11 5 15 11 2,1988+,3
New Zealand 11 - - 3 7 4 9 - 3 3 2,1991+,1
Norway  15 14 17 17 13 11 16 8 17 17 3
Portugal - - - - - - - - - - 2
Spain - - 1 - - - - - - 7 3,1985+,2
Sweden 14 12 18 15 13 13 15 7 16 17 3->2
Switzerland -  7 7 10 12 - 3 9 13 11 -
UK 4 2 10 6 6 2 6 2 5 3 2->1
US 2 5 4 3 1 7 2 1 1 3 1
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook, July 1997, table 3.4.  The columns are from the following studies
included in the OECD Employment Outlook: 1979, Blyth; 1981, Schmitter; 1984 (first entry), Cameron;
1984 (second entry), Lehmbruch; 1986 (first entry), Bruno and Sachs; 1986 (second entry), Tarantelli; 1988,
Calmfors/Driffil; 1990, Soskice; 1991, Lipjphart/Crepaz; 1991, Layard, Nickell, Jackman; 1995.  The entry
in the last column is from Elmeskov, Martin, Scarpetta, 1998.  In cases where there is a single entry it refers
to the entire period, with codes of 1 (decentralized wage setting) to 3 (centralized wage setting). In cases
where there are two entries separated by a date, the first refers to the period before the date and the second to
the period after.  In cases where there are two entries with an arrow, the entries refer to a general trend.50
Table 6: Employment Protection Indices
        Late 1980s                    Late 1990s                         Change
           A A B                         A
(1) (2)   (3) (4)
European Union 
Austria  2.2 2.2 2.3 0
Belgium 3.1 2.1 2.5 -1.0
Denmark 2.1 1.2 1.5 -0.9
Finland 2.3 2.0 2.1 -0.3
France  2.7 3.0 2.8    0.3
Germany  3.2 2.5 2.6   -0.7
Greece 3.6 3.6 3.5   0.0
Ireland 0.9 0.9 1.1   0.0
Italy 4.1 3.3 3.4 -0.8
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 2.1 -0.6
Norway 3.0 2.6 2.6 -0.4
Portugal 4.1 3.7 3.7 -0.4
Spain 3.7 3.1 3.1 -0.6
Sweden 3.5 2.2 2.6 -1.3
Switzerland 1.0 1.0 1.5   0.0
United Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0.9   0.0
non-EU countries
Australia 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.0  
Canada 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.0  
Japan – 2.4 2.3 --  
New Zealand – 2.6 0.9 --  
US 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.0  
Source: Columns, 1-3, OECD, Employment Outlook, 1999, table 2.5   Columns 1 and 2 use a measure of
protection for regular and temporary contracts.  Column 3 uses a more comprehensive measure that also
includes collective dismissal legislation.   Column 4 gives the difference between columns 1 and 2.51
Table 7:  Regulation of Business Formation and Protection of Investors in Advanced OECD Countries
Business Formation          Protection of Investors (higher= better)
     # Procedures       Days to get       Cost/GDP    Rule of Law    Anti-Director      Creditor 
        required          Approval        Per Capita        Rights           Rights
Australia  3    3 .0209 10 4 1
Austria  12 154              .4545 10 2 3
Belgium  8 42 .1001 10 0 2
Canada  2  2 .0140 10 4 1
Denmark  5 21 .0136 10 3 3
Finland   4 32 .0199 10 2 1
France 16 66 .1970 8.98 2 0
Germany  7 90 .0851 9.23 1 3
Greece 13 53 .4799 6.18 1 1
Ireland  4 25 .1145 7.80 3 1
Italy 11 121 .2474 8.33 0 2
Japan 11 50 .1144 8.98 3 2
Neth  8 77 .3031 10 2 2
N Zealand  3 17 .0042 10 4 3
Norway   6 24 .0249 10 3 2
Portugal 12 99 .3129 8.68 2 1
Spain 11 83 .1269 7.80 2 2
Sweden    4 17 .0254 10 2 2
Switz    12 88 .1336 10 1 1
UK 7 11 .0056 8.57 4 4
US 4  7             .0096 10 5 1
Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1999; La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997.  The number of procedures entry is a
count of the number of safety & health, environment, taxation, labor, and screening procedures needed to
legally start a new business.  The time entry is an estimate of the number of days before a new firm can start
operation.  The cost entry is an estimate of the monetary time and direct cost of meeting requirements as
fraction of GDP per capita in 1997.   The rule of law entry is an index from the International Country Risk
Guide.  The anti-director rights entry is an index that measures shareholder rights (scaled from 0 to 5) while
the creditor rights entry is an index of creditor rights (scaled from 0 to 4).52
Table 8: Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
for Various Countries, 1960-1998
                  In 1998 U.S. Dollars       Relative to U.S.=100    
                Using PPP Exchange Rates   Based on PPP Exchange Rates
                
                  1960     1979     1998     1960     1979     1998
United Kingdom    9,974   15,202   21,502       74       68       66
 
Major Competitors:
West Germany      9,842   17,769   24,868       73       80       77
France            8,546   17,064   22,255       64       77       69
United States    13,414   22,254   32,413      100      100      100
Other Countries:
Italy             7,286   15,369   22,234       54       69       69
Austria           7,666   15,817   23,930       57       71       74
Belgium           8,069   16,016   24,239       60       72       75
Denmark           9,793   16,807   26,176       73       76       81
Netherlands       9,351   16,736   24,008       70       75       74
Norway            8,120   16,244   27,581       61       73       85
Sweden            9,894   16,765   21,218       74       75       65
Japan             4,672   14,812   24,170       35       67       75
Canada           10,503   19,099   25,496       78       86       79
UK Rank (out of 13)                              3rd     12th     12th
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000).53
Table 9:  Growth Rates in Real Gross Domestic per Capita and Its Components 
                    GDP/Capita                 GDP/Labor Input            Labor Input/Capita    
            Pre-1979 Post-1979 Change    Pre-1979 Post-1979 Change     Pre-1979 Post-1979 Change
A. Labor Input Measured as Number of Workers 
U.K.           2.32     2.03    -0.29       2.50     1.76    -0.74      -0.18     0.27     0.45
              (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)     (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)
W. Germany     2.95     1.19    -1.76       3.67     1.55    -2.12      -0.72    -0.35     0.36
              (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.14)     (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)     (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)
France         3.34     1.27    -2.07       3.66     1.76    -1.90      -0.32    -0.49    -0.16
              (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.12)     (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.05)
Italy          3.66     1.49    -2.17       4.56     1.99    -2.56      -0.90    -0.50     0.39
              (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.14)     (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.21)     (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)
Ireland        3.48     3.71     0.23       4.29     3.20    -1.09      -0.81     0.51     1.32
              (0.17)   (0.17)   (0.23)     (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.18)   (0.18)   (0.25)
U.S.           1.84     1.98     0.14       1.56     1.49    -0.08       0.28     0.50     0.21
              (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.17)     (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.13)     (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.08)
B. Labor Input Measured as Total Annual Hours
U.K.           2.32     2.03    -0.29       3.44     2.10    -1.34      -1.11    -0.07     1.04
              (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.09)     (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.13)
W. Germany     2.95     1.19    -1.76       4.74     2.18    -2.55      -1.78    -0.99     0.79
              (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.14)     (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.09)     (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)
France         3.34     1.27    -2.07       4.57     2.02    -2.55      -1.24    -0.75     0.48
              (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)     (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)
Italy          3.66     1.49    -2.17       5.36     2.21    -3.15      -1.70    -0.72     0.98
              (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.14)     (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.19)     (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)
U.S.           1.84     1.98     0.14       2.06     1.51    -0.55      -0.22     0.47     0.69
              (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.17)     (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)     (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.09)
Notes: Coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) obtained from linear regression models fit
to annual data from 1960 to 1999.  GDP per capita represents real GDP divided by total civilian
working age population (age 15/16 or older).54
Table 10: Decomposition of Relative Growth Rates of GDP per Capita
Between the United Kingdom and Other Countries
                 
                     Difference      Decomposition 1        Decomposition 2
                     In Growth                              
                       Rate of                Employment/              Hours/
                     GDP/Capita    GDP/Worker   Capita     GDP/Hour    Capita
                        (1)           (2)        (3)         (4)        (5)
A.  1960-1979
United Kingdom         -0.63         -1.17       0.54       -1.30       0.67
 - West Germany        (0.13)        (0.11)     (0.10)      (0.09)     (0.12)
United Kingdom         -1.02         -1.16       0.14       -1.13       0.12
 - France              (0.13)        (0.11)     (0.08)      (0.10)     (0.12)
United Kingdom          0.48          0.94      -0.46        1.38      -0.89
 - United States       (0.16)        (0.12)     (0.08)      (0.11)     (0.11)
B.  1979-1999
United Kingdom          0.84          0.21       0.62       -0.08       0.92
 - West Germany        (0.13)        (0.10)     (0.10)      (0.09)     (0.12)
United Kingdom          0.76          0.00       0.76        0.08       0.68
 - France              (0.13)        (0.11)     (0.08)      (0.11)     (0.12)
United Kingdom          0.05          0.27      -0.23        0.59      -0.54
 - United States       (0.15)        (0.12)     (0.09)      (0.11)     (0.11)
C. Difference in Growth Rates: 1979-99 Compared to 1960-79
United Kingdom          1.47          1.38       0.09        1.21       0.25
 - West Germany        (0.18)        (0.14)     (0.14)      (0.13)     (0.17)
United Kingdom          1.78          1.16       0.61        1.21       0.56
 - France              (0.17)        (0.16)     (0.11)      (0.14)     (0.17)
United Kingdom         -0.43         -0.66       0.24       -0.79       0.35
 - United States       (0.21)        (0.16)     (0.13)      (0.15)     (0.16)
Notes: Entries in column 1 represent the difference in the estimated trend growth rate
in GDP per capita between the UK and the comparison country.  Decomposition 1 in columns
2 and 3 divides GDP per capita into GDP per employed worker and employment per capita. 
Decomposition 2 in columns 4 and 5 divides GDP per capita into GDP per hour worked, and
hours per capita.  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.55
Table 11: Contributions of Shift Out of Agriculture 
to Labor Productivity Trends 
                                            Relative       Growth Effect of
                   Percent of Workers     Productivity    Shift out of Agric.
                    In Agriculture       of Agriculture   (Percent per year)
                  1960   1979   1998      1960    1979     1960-79  1979-98
                   (1)    (2)    (3)       (4)     (5)       (6)      (7)
United Kingdom     4.7    2.7    1.7      32.6    56.9       0.07     0.02
West Germany      13.9    5.2    2.8      17.8    31.6       0.38     0.09
France            23.2    8.8    4.2      32.1    51.1       0.52     0.12
United States      8.5    3.6    2.6      59.3    75.3       0.11     0.01
Notes: Entries in columns 1-3 represent the fraction of civilian employment in
agriculture.  Source: US BLS (2000b).  The entries in columns 4 and 5 represent
estimates of the value added per worker in agriculture relative to other sectors
of the economy (in percent). Source: based on data reported in van Ark (1996,
Appendix Tables 1 and 2).  The entries in columns 6 and 7 represent share-shift
estimates of the effect of the movement out of agricultural employment on the
annual growth rate of labor productivity for the economy as a whole.56
Table 12: Contributions of Capital Accumulation to Relative Trends in Labor Productivity
                                                                           Productivity Growth
                  GDP/Labor Input            Capital/Labor Input           Net of Capital Effects 
                1960-    1980-                1960-    1980-                1960-    1980-  
                1979     1999    Change       1979    1999    Change       1980     1999   Change
                (1)      (2)      (3)         (4)      (5)     (6)          (7)      (8)     (9)
A. Labor Input Measured as Number of Workers
U.K.           2.50     1.76    -0.74         4.39     1.59    -2.80      0.96     1.20     0.24
              (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)       (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.15)    (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)
W. Germany     3.67     1.55    -2.12         4.55     1.27    -3.28       2.08     1.11   -0.97
              (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)       (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.15)     (0.08)   (0.08)  (0.11)
France         3.66     1.76    -1.90         4.39     2.27    -2.12       2.12     0.97   -1.16
              (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.12)       (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.17)     (0.09)   (0.09)  (0.13)
U.S.           1.56     1.49    -0.08         1.36     0.28    -1.08       1.08     1.39    0.30
              (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.13)       (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.12)     (0.10)   (0.10)  (0.14)
B.  Labor Input Measured as Total Annual Hours
U.K.           3.44     2.10    -1.34         5.33     1.93    -3.40       1.57     1.42   -0.15
              (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.09)       (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.17)     (0.07)   (0.08)  (0.11)
W. Germany     4.74     2.18    -2.55         5.61     1.90    -3.71       2.78     1.52   -1.25
              (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.09)       (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.16)     (0.08)   (0.07)  (0.11)
France         4.57     2.02    -2.55         5.30     2.54    -2.76       2.72     1.13   -1.58
              (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.11)       (0.15)   (0.16)   (0.22)     (0.10)   (0.10)  (0.13)
U.S.           2.06     1.51    -0.55         1.86     0.31    -1.56      1.41      1.40   -0.00
              (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.12)       (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.13)    (0.10)    (0.10)  (0.13)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Entries in columns 1-6 obtained from linear regression
models fit to annual data from 1960 to 1999 for real GDP per unit of labor input, and real net
capital per unit of labor input.  Entries in columns 7-9 represent differences between growth rate
of GDP per labor input, and 0.35 times the growth rate in capital per unit of labor input.  See text
equation (1).57
Table 13: Estimates of the Rate of Growth of Labor Quality
                                                Growth Rate of Labor Quality
                                                      (Percent per year)    
Country           Data Sources                   Pre-1979/80    Post-1979/80
United Kingdom    General Household Survey          0.23
a          0.87
                  (GHS) microdata, 1975-96          
                  Weights from wage equation
                  fit to 1984-86 data
West Germany      Unpublished tabulations from      0.49
b          0.21
                  Microcensus, 1976-99 for
                  110 gender×education×age
                  cells
                  Weights from wage equation
                  fit to GSOEP microdata in
                  1985
United States     Current Population Survey         0.33
c          0.39 
                  (CPS) microdata, 1979-99 
                  plus 1960 Census microdata
                  Weights from wage equation
                  fit to 1984 CPS data
                  Hours-based index
Notes: See text for description of method.
      
aBased on changes from 1975 to 1980.
     
bBased on changes from 1976 to 1980.
 
cBased on changes from 1959 to 1979.58
Table 14: Summary of Contributions to Trends in Growth Rate
of Labor Productivity per Hour Worked
                                                                  Adjusted 
                                                                Productivity
               Productivity        Contributions of:            Growth Rate:    
                 Growth      Shift Out  Capital    Labor     Excluding Including
                  Rate       of Agric.  per Hour  Quality     Quality   Quality
A.  1960-79:
United Kingdom    3.44         0.07       1.87       –-         1.50       --
West Germany      4.74         0.38       1.96       --         2.40       –-
France            4.57         0.52       1.86       --         2.19       --
United States     2.06         0.11       0.65      0.21        1.30      1.09
B.  1979-99:
United Kingdom    2.10         0.02       0.68      0.57        1.40      0.83
West Germany      2.18         0.09       0.67      0.14        1.42      1.28
France            2.02         0.12       0.89       --         1.01       --
United States     1.51         0.01       0.11      0.25        1.39      1.14
C. Change from Pre- to Post-1979:
United Kingdom   -1.34        -0.05      -1.19       –-        -0.10       --
West Germany     -2.56        -0.29      -1.29       –-        -0.98       --
France           -2.55        -0.40      -0.97       --        -1.18       --
United States    -0.55        -0.10      -0.54      0.04        0.09      0.05
Sources: Productivity growth rates from Table 9.  Contributions of shift out of agriculture from Table 11. 
Contributions of growth in capital per hour estimated by  multiplying trends in capital per hour in columns 4-5
of Table 12 by 0.35.  Contributions of labor quality obtained by multiplying entries in Table 13 by 0.65.59
Table 15: Unemployment Benefit Replacement Ratios, 1960-95
1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95
Australia 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.26
Austria 0.17 0.3 0.34 0.34
Belgium 0.4 0.55 0.5 0.48
Canada 0.43 0.59 0.57 0.58
Denmark 0.35 0.55 0.67 0.64
Finland 0.18 0.29 0.38 0.53
France 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.58
West Germany 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37
Ireland 0.24 0.44 0.5 0.4
Italy 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.26
Japan 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.3
Netherlands 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.7
Norway 0.13 0.28 0.56 0.62
New Zealand 0.3 0.27 0.3 0.29
Portugal – 0.17 0.44 0.65
Spain 0.48 0.62 0.75 0.68
Sweden 0.16 0.57 0.7 0.72
Switzerland 0.02 0.21 0.48 0.61
UK 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.22
US 0.23 0.28 0.3 0.26
Source: OECD. Based on the replacement ratio in the first year of an unemployment spell averaged over three
family types. 60
Table 16: Coefficients and Standard Errors on the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom in Regressions of
the level and ln change in Macro-economic variables, OECD countries, 1970-1999
                                                              Fraser Institute Index          Year                 Country 
Dependent Variable           Line No.     Coefficient   Std Error      Dummies?         Dummies?           R-squared
log GDP/Capita 1. 0.144 -0.017 Yes No 0.593
2. -0.001 -0.016 Yes Yes 0.929
) log GDP/Capita  3. -0.006 -0.006 Yes No 0.183
4. 0.001 -0.011 Yes Yes 0.449
log GDP/Worker 5. 0.332 -0.149 Yes No 0.053
6. -0.001 -0.015 Yes Yes 0.998
) log GDP/Worker 7. -0.012 -0.005 Yes No 0.170
8. -0.004 -0.009 Yes Yes 0.425
log  Employment/Pop. 9. 1.349 -0.759 Yes No 0.044
10. 0.351 -0.606 Yes Yes 0.87
  ) log Employment/Pop. 11. 0.005 -0.005 Yes No 0.113
12. 0.020 -0.010 Yes Yes 0.213
Source:  Calculated using OECD Historical Statistics (1999);  and Fraser Institute Index data as reported in
Table 1.61
















United Kingdom 23.3 76.7 15.2 19.3 80.7 19.5
Germany 21.3 78.7 13.7 15.9 84.1 19.3
France  26.7 73.4 15.8 19.1 80.9 19.1
Italy 23.4 76.6 11.7 15.3 84.7 18.5
Ireland 30.5 69.5 15.7 23.1 76.9 14.8
United States 31 69 13.3 22.3 77.7 15.4
Note: Based on data in OECD Labour Force Statistics 1977-1997.62
Appendix Table 2: Employment-Population Rates and 
Annual Hours per Capita, 1960-1999
            United    West                               United
           Kingdom   Germany  France    Italy   Ireland  States
A. Employment-Population Rate (ages 15+ or 16+)
  1960        60.6     59.2     58.6     54.0     53.1     56.1
  1965        61.0     58.5     56.4     49.6     53.8     56.2
  1970        59.2     56.6     56.0     47.4     52.0     57.4
  1975        59.7     53.2     54.8     46.0     48.4     56.1
  1980        58.1     53.1     53.8     46.1     48.3     59.2
  1985        55.5     50.7     50.9     44.4     42.4     60.1
  1990        59.6     52.6     50.9     43.9     44.2     62.8
  1995        57.2     49.6     48.7     41.5     46.9     62.9
  1999        59.1     48.8     49.6     42.3     54.1     64.3
B. Annual Hours per Capita (ages 15+ or 16+)
  1960        1250     1260     1184     1132     1137     1096
  1965        1219     1192     1130      970      -       1091
  1970        1128     1091     1084      933      -       1071
  1975        1063      947      991      847     1000
*    1016
  1980         993      916      927      824      913     1052
  1985         933      849      816      770      766     1068
  1990         992      851      815      759      764     1100
  1995         924      775      776      712      797     1106
  1999         956      755      788      724      920     1138
Notes: Employment and population data from BLS (2000).  Population refers
to the adult population (ages 16 and older in the US, ages 15-64 in other
countries).  Hours data for the U.K., Germany, France, and the U.S. are
based on estimates of annual hours per worker from O’Mahoney (unpublished
tables), updated using data from the OECD and the International
Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project.  Hours data for
Italy are based on data from OECD.  Hours data for Ireland are based on
data from ICOP. 63
Appendix Table 3: Employment Shares in Three Major Sectors, 1960-1998
                             
       United Kingdom      West Germany          France               U.S.     
      Agr.  Ind.  Srv.   Agr.  Ind.  Srv.   Agr.  Ind.  Srv.   Agr.  Ind.  Srv.
1960   4.7  46.1  49.2   13.9  46.0  40.1   23.2  37.5  39.3    8.5  33.4  58.1
1979   2.7  37.3  60.0    5.2  42.9  51.9    8.8  35.4  55.8    3.6  30.2  66.2
1998   1.7  26.1  72.2    2.8  33.6  63.6    4.2  23.9  71.9    2.6  22.2  75.2
Notes: Entries represent civilian employment shares in agriculture (agr.),
industry (ind.) and services (srv.).  Source: US BLS (2000b). 64
Appendix Table 4: Changes in Skill Characteristics of UK Workers, 1975-96
                          Percent with      
            Mean Years  Higher Vocational    Percent with       Percent
Period      Schooling    Qualifications    University Degree     Male
1975-77        10.8           6.5               4.6              59.5
1978-80        11.1           7.6               5.8              57.7
1981-83        11.2           8.5               6.6              56.8
1984-86        11.6          11.5               9.0              54.8
1987-89        11.8          13.1               9.9              53.0
1990-92        12.0          13.7              10.6              51.1
1993-96        12.4          14.8              13.3              49.8 
Notes: Based on unweighted tabulations of individuals who were employed
during the survey week in the 1975-96 General Household Surveys.  Mean
years of schooling is calculated following Schmitt (1996).  Higher
qualifications include National Higher Certificate or Diploma, City and
Guilds Advanced and Full Technological Certificates, qualifications
obtained from Polytechnical and similar institutions, and Ordinary
National Certificate or Diploma.  65
Appendix Table 5:  Union Membership Rate Among Wage and Salary Employees
in the United Kingdom and the United States, 1960-1999
                      United Kingdom                  
                   (1)              (2)           United States
    1960           41.3              –-                  30.4
    1965           40.5              –-                  27.6
    1970           48.2              –-                  26.4
    1975           49.4              –-                  24.6
    1980           52.9              –-                  22.2
    1985           46.6              –-                  17.5 
    1990           40.0             38.1                 15.3
    1995            –-              32.1                 14.0
    1999            –-              29.5                 13.5
Notes: Column (1) is taken from Metcalf (1994, Table 4.1) and is estimated from
union membership data.  Column (2) is taken from Hicks (2000, Table 2) and is
based on Labor Force Survey data.   Column (3) is taken from Freeman (1997),
updated by Farber and Western (2000), and is based on a combination of data
sources.66
Appendix Table 6: Self-Employment Rates in the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, and the United States, 1960-1999
                                        West
              United Kingdom       Germany        United States
                       (1)               (2)              (3)
    1960               7.2                --           --
    1965               6.7              --              8.9
    1970               7.7               16.6             8.3
    1975               8.0               14.0      8.9
    1980               8.4               11.7           9.6
    1985              11.3               11.4      9.9
    1990              13.1               10.6     10.6
    1995              13.0               11.0     10.9
    1999              12.7               11.3     10.3
Notes: Column (1) is derived from data in Economic Trends (Annual Supplement,
1997, Table 3.8), updated with data from the Labor Force Survey.  Column (2) is
derived from data in Statistisches Jahrbuch (1998, Table 6.3): the estimated
self-employment count includes family workers.  Column (3) is based on authors’
tabulations of March Current Population Survey.  1965 entry for U.S. is based on
1967 data.67
Appendix Table 7: Fraction of Employment in Government or Public Sectors
              United Kingdom                               
                     Nationalized   General Government    United States 
          Government  Industries    Germany     France    (Public Sector)
              (1)        (2)          (3)         (4)           (5) 
    1960      15.2       8.8           8.1        --             --
    1965      16.3       7.5           --         --            15.3
    1970      18.7       7.6          10.9        --            15.6
 
    1975      21.7       7.3          13.0       17.4           17.5
    1980      21.9       7.1           --         --            16.2
    1985      22.7       4.6          15.5       22.9           15.0
    1990      21.3       2.5          15.1       22.8           15.0
    1995      19.7       1.4          15.1       24.8           14.4
    1999      --         --            --         --            14.1
Notes: Data in columns (1) and (2) are derived from data in Economic Trends
(Annual Supplement, 1997, Table 3.8).  Government includes general government and
National Health Service Trusts (after 1991).  Nationalized industries include the
Post Office.  Data in columns (3) and (4) are taken from OECD Historical
Statistics, 1960-1994, Table 2.13.  Data in column (5) are based on authors’
tabulations of March Current Population Survey, and include employees who report
















































Figure 1: Trends in Real GDP per Capita Relative to 1979 for United Kingdom, West Germany


































































































Figure 2:  Trends in Real GDP per Worker and Employment per Capita Relative to 1979 for
United Kingdom, West Germany and France, and the United States
A.  Real GDP per Worker



























































































Figure 3:  Trends in Real GDP per Hour and Hours per Capita Relative to 1979 for United
Kingdom, West Germany and France, and the United States
A.  Real GDP per Hour













































Figure 4: Trends in Capital per Worker In the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and the
United States